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TWO YEARS LATER
AND COUNTING:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S
TAXING POWER DECISION
ON THE GOALS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT*
HON. ALBERTO R. GONZALES**
DONALD B. STUART, ESQ.***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, in a highly anticipated decision, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a requirement that most Americans obtain health
insurance or pay a monetary penalty.1 The statute in question that contained this
requirement, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Act or ACA), often
labeled as “Obamacare,” or the Affordable Care Act, was a monumental piece of
legislation (over 900 pages) that was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Barack Obama in 2010.2 The Act represented a significant overhaul of
the country’s health care system and structure. The primary objectives of this
Copyright © 2014 by Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart.
* An earlier version of this article was previously published as: Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B.
Stuart, What Implications Will the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision Have on the Goals of
the Affordable Care Act and Healthcare?, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 189 (2013). © 2013.
American Health Lawyers Association, www.healthlawyers.org/JHLSL. All rights reserved.
** Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales is former Counsel to the President and the United States Attorney
General under the George W. Bush Administration. He is currently the Dean and Doyle Rogers
Distinguished Chair of Law at Belmont University College of Law.
*** Donald B. Stuart, Esquire is a partner at Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP in Nashville,
Tennessee and practices in the areas of federal and state taxation and corporate and business
transactions, with a focus on the healthcare industry. Mr. Stuart is a member of Waller’s
Healthcare Department and represents both public and private companies and also nonprofit
organizations. The authors thank Christine Oberholtzer (J.D. Candidate 2014, Belmont University
College of Law) for her valuable assistance.
1. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter National
Federation].
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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legislation were to expand the number of individuals covered by health insurance
and decrease the overall cost of health care in the country.3
Some have referred to the components of the Act as a three-legged stool: (1)
make health insurance coverage available through Medicaid expansion and
insurance reforms,4 (2) require everyone to buy health insurance and provide
subsidies to help pay the costs,5 and (3) decrease reimbursement for providers (such
as hospitals) to help fund expanded coverage.6 Without all three components
working together, some experts believe it is unlikely that the reforms under the Act
will work.7
Upon its passage by Congress and the President’s signature, the Act
immediately fell into legal challenge and wound its way through various federal
district courts and courts of appeals.8 Finally, on a writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court reviewed
certain key provisions of the Act and issued a decision on June 28, 2012.9 The two
provisions of the Act subject to constitutional challenge were the individual
mandate, requiring individuals to purchase a minimum level of health insurance or
pay a penalty, and the expansion of Medicaid, including the increase in funds
provided to the states conditioned on such states’ participation in the Medicaid
expansion.10

3. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring most individuals to maintain a certain
basic level of health care, thereby expanding the pool of insured individuals and lowering overall
costs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (Supp. V 2006) (enacting specific provisions to save
Americans money on health insurance).
4. See, e.g., Aaron Carroll, Stools Need More Than Two Legs, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(Nov. 11, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/stools-need-more-thantwo-legs/ (describing the three legs as the expansion of coverage, the Individual Mandate, and tax
subsidies); see also Susan Cancelosi, What To Do, What To Do: Employer Health Benefit Plans
During and After 2012’s Uncertainty, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 569, 572–73, 587 (2013) (noting
prohibitions on denial of coverage for pre-existing conditions and provisions that grant allowances
for college-age students to be covered by their parents’ insurance).
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (implementing the Individual Mandate); 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (Supp.
V 2012) (providing for subsidies).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–17 (Supp. V 2012) (implementing provisions for evidence-based
reimbursement structures that tie payment to the quality of performance).
7. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4 (explaining that the Individual Mandate creates the
financial base for expanded coverage while the subsidies enable individuals to afford buying
health insurance).
8. On the day signed into law, thirteen states filed a complaint against the Act in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Serv., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom, Fla. ex
rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); see
13 Attorneys General Sue Over Health Care Overhaul, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-23-attorneys-general-health-suit_N.htm.
9. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
10. Id.
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Under the individual mandate, most residents of the United States will need to
have health insurance coverage by January 1, 2014 or face a financial penalty that
could, when fully phased in, range from $695 to $12,500 depending on the
individual’s filing status and number of dependents.11 The Supreme Court’s
majority upheld the individual mandate as part of Congress’s “taxing power” under
the Constitution.12 The Court held that the penalty under the individual mandate,
otherwise known as the “shared responsibility payment,” may be reasonably
imposed as a “tax” on individuals under the taxing power of Congress.13 The Court
found that even though the individual mandate was motivated by a regulatory
purpose, it was nonetheless acceptable because an individual may choose to act and
buy health insurance or not act and pay the financial penalty (tax).14 The Court
stated that it was not its role to decide the “wisdom or fairness” of such a tax, only
the constitutionality of it.15
The expansion of Medicaid as originally enacted required that states receiving
federal Medicaid funding substantially expand their Medicaid programs.16 In order
to continue to receive Medicaid funds, states would have been required to provide
healthcare to all qualifying adults with income up to 133% of the Federal Poverty
Level (FPL).17 Although Medicaid funding is optional, all fifty states receive it.18
Further, although federal funds have been allocated to support the expansion, after
2016, states are required to fund a portion of the Medicaid expansion themselves.19
States that did not wish to expand their Medicaid programs under the original Act
would have lost all federal Medicaid funding, including funding for Medicaid
programs in place since the program’s inception in 1965.20 However, the Supreme
Court found the requirement to expand Medicaid to be unconstitutional “economic
dragooning” under the Spending Clause.21 The Court took no issue with the
expansion of Medicaid in general, only the portion of the Act that made expansion

11. See id. at 2580 (discussing the “penalty” liability incurred by noncompliance with the
Individual Mandate).
12. See id. at 2600.
13. Id. at 2595, 2600.
14. See id. at 2600 (explaining that Congress’s taxing power does not allow for the same kind
of punitive regulatory force that other sanctions have, nor does it constrain freedom as other
regulatory penalties do).
15. Id.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. V 2012) (enabling the Secretary to withhold Medicaid
payments to noncompliant states).
17. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
18. See Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching
Shares for Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or
Disabled Persons for October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012, 75 Fed. Reg. 69082, 69083
(Nov. 10, 2010) (showing that every state receives Medicaid assistance).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2011).
21. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012).
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a prerequisite for federal Medicaid funding.22 As a result of that decision, the
Medicaid expansion became a voluntary option for the states, with no penalty for
the states that have chosen not to participate.23 Because the Act was originally
designed to be implemented in a much larger healthcare market, the Supreme Court
decision has had a notable impact on the efficacy of the Act.
In the 2012 elections, President Obama won re-election and Senate democrats
strengthened their majority in the U.S. Senate.24 Consequently, many experts
believed the Act was here to stay;25 however, questions remain regarding its
implementation. Although the Supreme Court essentially ended two years of
uncertainty on the legal status of the Act, it is now unclear whether the original
goals of the Act and the individual mandate—adding millions of new consumers to
the health insurance market and increasing the number and share of Americans who
are insured26—can still be met. This article explores the Court’s taxing power
decision with respect to the individual mandate and the direct implications of that
decision to not only the Act’s objectives for greater individual health insurance
coverage, but also the possible impact in other health care areas. Two years after
the Court’s decision, the Act’s overall implementation is still uncertain. As states
work to implement the Act or choose to maintain their own healthcare models, the
healthcare market is in a state of flux. Due partially to the Court’s decision to
restrict the Medicaid expansion, the Act’s effectiveness is now more questionable
than ever. Questions addressed by this Article include whether there really still is a
legal individual mandate requiring the purchase of health insurance27 and whether
further legislation could be possible under Congress’s taxing power if the goals
under the Act are not met.28 This article also reviews the question of whether there
22. Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that states accepting
such funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize
States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away existing Medicaid
funding.”).
23. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE
ACA’S
MEDICAID
EXPANSION
10
(August
2012),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf (explaining that the Court’s
holding gives states discretion on whether to expand Medicaid).
24. See,
e.g.,
2012
Presidential
Election
Results,
WASH.
POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/election-map-2012/president/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014); Ted Barrett & Catherine E. Shoichet, Democrats Keep Control of Senate, CNN
POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/06/politics/senate-preview/.
25. See, e.g., Emily Jane Fox, Obama’s Re-election Secures Health Care Reform, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 7, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/pf/health-care-reformobama/ (stating that Obama’s re-election would “neutralize” challenges to the Affordable Care
Act).
26. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (codifying the Individual Mandate, a manifestation of the
overall goal of increasing the number of covered individuals); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18
(Supp. V 2012) (enacting specific provisions to save Americans money on health insurance).
27. See infra Part IV.A.
28. See infra Part IV.D.
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has been an expansion of Congress’s taxing power,29 along with an analysis of
current efforts at implementation and consideration of whether the Court’s decision
may ultimately have done more harm than good to the individual mandate.30
II.

THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

The Act consists of a number of key provisions. First, there is the individual
mandate requiring individuals to maintain minimum essential coverage or pay a
shared responsibility payment (the Individual Mandate).31 Certain classes of
individuals are exempt from either the Individual Mandate or the tax penalty for
non-compliance.32 Second, there is the expansion of Medicaid, which provides
federal funding for states wishing to expand their Medicaid programs to include all
adults earning 133% of the FPL or less (the Medicaid Expansion).33 Third, there is
the employer mandate, which imposes penalties on employers for failing to provide
affordable healthcare to employees (the Employer Mandate).34 The Employer
Mandate, or more commonly referred to as the “play or pay” rules,35 has been
delayed and the penalty provisions will not become effective now until 2015.36
A.

Overview of the Act’s Insurance Provisions

Under the Act, the federal and state governments, insurance companies,
employers, and individuals “are given shared responsibility to reform and improve
the availability, quality, and affordability of health insurance coverage in the
United States.”37 The primary goal of the Act is to increase the number of
individuals in the United States having health insurance.38 The provisions of the
29. See infra Part V.A.
30. See infra Parts IV.B–C.
31. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (codifying the Individual Mandate).
32. See id. §§ 5000A(d)–(e) (exempting from the Individual Mandate, for example,
incarcerated individuals, and from the penalty, individuals under the poverty line).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1396A(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012) (codifying the Employer Mandate).
35. See Cancelosi, supra note 4, at 578 (discussing the details of the Act and ramifications for
employers).
36. Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Continuingto-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx (discussing the delay of the
Employer Mandate).
37. IRS Q&A on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
(June 26, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-SharedResponsibility-Provision [hereinafter IRS Q&A].
38. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring all applicable individuals to maintain
minimum essential coverage each month, starting January 1, 2014); see also Dinsmore & Shohl
LLP, Breaking Down the Affordable Care Act, THE NAT’L LAW REV. (June 11, 2010),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/breaking-down-affordable-care-act (discussing the ACA’s
fundamental goals of improving the quality of health care and making health care more affordable
and accessible).
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Act that address health insurance coverage do so through a combination of
incentives and penalties. Specifically, they (i) establish a legal mandate that most
individuals in the United States obtain health insurance for themselves and their
dependents or pay a financial penalty,39 (ii) establish health insurance exchanges
throughout the country in which individuals can, with subsidies, purchase health
insurance,40 (iii) expand Medicaid eligibility to certain nonelderly legal residents,41
and (iv) place a penalty on certain employers who do not provide minimum health
benefits to their employees.42
Starting in 2014, individuals and their families with family income at or
below 133% (effectively 138%)43 of the FPL will be eligible for Medicaid coverage
if their state expands Medicaid eligibility.44 In addition, premium assistance tax
credits will be offered to low and middle income individuals and their families to
purchase health insurance.45 Individuals will be able to purchase health insurance
from new health insurance exchanges at prices that reflect “community-rated,

39. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (describing the requirement of maintaining minimum essential
coverage for all individuals and dependents of the individual, starting after 2013); id. §
5000A(b)(1) (imposing a penalty on any individual or dependent of the individual who does not
maintain minimum essential coverage for one or more months).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring each State to establish an American
Health Benefit Exchange prior to January 1, 2014); id. §18031(d)(2)(A) (requiring that the
exchanges make available for purchase qualified health plans for individuals); id. §18031(d)(4)(G)
(requiring that the exchange calculate the actual cost of coverage to the individual after applying
any premium tax credits or cost-sharing reductions).
41. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(10)(A)(i)(VII) (Supp. V 2012) (expanding Medicaid to all individuals,
beginning January 1, 2014, who are under the age of sixty-five and whose income does not exceed
133% of the FPL). However, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, Medicaid expansion in
each state is now optional and not required. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2607–08 (2012).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H)(a) (Supp. V 2012) (imposing on a large employer who does not offer
health coverage an assessable payment if at least one full time employee has purchased a qualified
health plan and qualifies for premium tax credits or cost-sharing reduction). This provision is now
delayed until 2015 following a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services. See
JANEMARIE MULVEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43150, DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER ACA 1 (2013).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012). There is a 5% income disregard, so the
effective rate is 138% of the FPL. See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ AND THOMAS GABE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41137, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 6 (2013) (discussing the state option to expand Medicaid to
individuals with income up to 133% FPL, with an ACA income disregard of 5% FPL).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012). For a family of four in 2014, 138% of
the FPL would be around $33,000. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF
THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (March 2012) (discussing the effects that the ACA
will have on the prevalence of employer-provided health care).
45. See FERNANDEZ AND GABE, supra note 43, at 4 (discussing the applicability of the
premium tax credit to households with incomes between 100–400% of the FPL).
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guaranteed-issue” insurance coverage.46 Employed individuals with family income
between 138% and 400% of the FPL will be eligible for some form of subsidy to
purchase insurance through these insurance exchanges if their employer does not
offer coverage.47 Employers with more than fifty employees that do not offer
health insurance and have at least one employee who receives a subsidy for the
insurance exchange will be subject to a penalty.48 Certain small employers may be
eligible for a tax credit that covers a percentage of their contributions to health
insurance premiums.49
B.

Individual Mandate Requirement

The Individual Mandate requiring most individuals to maintain minimum
essential health insurance coverage was one of the key features of the Act.50 Under
the statute, individuals not exempt and who do not comply with the Individual
Mandate must make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Government (i.e.,
include an additional payment with their federal income tax return).51 The
Individual Mandate is incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) as
new Code Section 5000A, which is included as part of Subtitle D “Miscellaneous
Excise Taxes” of the Code.52 Pursuant to Code Section 5000A, beginning January
1, 2014, an “applicable individual” must “ensure that the individual, and any
dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under
minimum essential coverage.”53 The Individual Mandate applies to individuals,
regardless of age, including children, and is required to be met each month in the
calendar year.54 For many Americans, the Individual Mandate will likely have little
46. See CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON
NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 44,
at 6 (discussing how the ACA, in 2014, will enable individuals and families to purchase health
insurance on exchanges at prices that do not depend on their health status).
47. See id. (stating that employed individuals with income below 138% FPL will be eligible
for Medicaid, while those with income between 200–400% FPL will be eligible for some amount
of federal subsidies through the exchanges if they do not receive employer-sponsored health
insurance).
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. (explaining that eligibility for this credit is for small businesses that do not employ
more than twenty-five workers and earn less than $50,000 indexed to the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) beginning in 2014).
50. See Alvin Tran, FAQ: How Will The Individual Mandate Work?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/september/03/faq-on-individualinsurance-mandate-aca.aspx (explaining why the Individual Mandate was established, who it
applies to, and how to satisfy the mandate).
51. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (“If . . . an applicable individual . . . fails to
meet the requirements of subsection (a) for 1 or more months . . . there is hereby imposed on the
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures.”).
52. Id. § 5000A(a) (requiring every applicable individual to maintain minimum essential
coverage each month).
53. Id.
54. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 3.
THE
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impact on them as most people will either have health insurance from their
employer or be covered under a Governmental or public program.55 Ultimately,
about one in ten Americans subject to the Individual Mandate will need to decide
whether to obtain health insurance coverage or pay the penalty.56
1. Minimum Essential Coverage
The requirement for individuals to maintain “minimum essential coverage”
means that each individual needs to be covered under one of the following types of
health insurance coverage:
(1) Government sponsored programs, such as (i) Medicare Part A, (ii)
Medicaid, (iii) Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), (iv) TRICARE, (v)
a health care program administered by the Veterans Administration, (vi) a health
care program for Peace Corps volunteers or (vii) a Non-appropriated Fund Health
Benefits Program of the Department of Defense;
(2) Eligible employer-sponsored plans (i.e., generally a group health plan or
group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to the employee, including
COBRA and retiree coverage);
(3) Health plan coverage purchased in the individual market;
(4) Grandfathered health plans; or
(5) Other health benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits risk pool.57
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was granted authority
by the Act to designate other types of “minimum essential coverage.”58 HHS has
already acted upon that authority and recently provided for the following additional
acceptable coverages:
(1) Medicare Advantage plans.

55. See Highlights 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/
data/ incpovhlth/2012/highlights.html (last revised Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that 54.9% of
individuals have employment-based health insurance, and 32.6% of individuals have health
insurance through a government plan).
56. See id. (finding nearly 90% of people are covered by either employment-based health
insurance or government health insurance).
57. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(f).
58. Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(E) (“Such other health benefits coverage . . . as the Secretary of Health
and Human Services . . . recognizes for purposes of this subsection”).
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(2) Refugee Medical Assistance supported by the Administration for Children
and Families.
(3) State high risk pools for plan or policy years that begin on or before Dec.
31, 2014.
(4) Self-funded health coverage offered to students by universities for plan or
policy years that begin on or before Dec. 31, 2014.59
Minimum essential coverage, however, does not include coverage that
provides for only limited benefits, such as only vision or dental care, Medicaid
covering only family planning, workers’ compensation, or disability policies.60
Many Americans subject to the Individual Mandate will have the required
coverage through either their employer or through the Medicaid or Medicare
programs.61 If, however, an individual does not have any of the approved types of
health coverage and does not qualify for an exemption, he or she will have to either
make a shared responsibility payment or obtain insurance through a health
insurance exchange or private company in the market in order to maintain
minimum essential coverage.62
2. Applicable Individuals—Exemptions
The Individual Mandate for minimum essential coverage only applies to
“applicable individuals,” which includes most individual Americans (adults and
children), but excludes several categories of individuals.63 Specifically, the Act
exempts the following four categories of individuals from the Individual Mandate:
(1) An individual holding a “religious conscience exemption” which
certifies that the individual is a member of a recognized religious sect or division,
and an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division.64

59. See 45 C.F.R. §156.602 (2013).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(3) (Supp. V 2012) (excluding from satisfying “minimum essential
coverage” health care plans and benefits that are described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of
subsection (c) of section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg91(c)(2006)).
61. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 1–2 (listing health insurance plans that qualify as
minimum essential coverage, including employer-sponsored coverage, Medicare, and Medicaid).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (requiring all applicable individuals to maintain minimum essential
coverage); id. § 5000A(b)(1) (imposing a penalty if an applicable individual does not maintain
minimum essential coverage); id. § 5000A(e) (establishing exceptions to the Individual Mandate
for certain individuals); id. § 5000A(f) (defining what constitutes minimum essential coverage,
including qualified health plans offered by private insurance companies in or out of the state
exchanges).
63. Id. § 5000A(d) (defining individuals who are not “applicable individuals” and do not have
to comply with the Individual Mandate).
64. Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A).
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(2) Any individual that is a member of a recognized “health care sharing
ministry.”65
(3) Any individual that is (i) not a United States citizen or United States
national or (ii) an alien not lawfully present in the United States.66
(4) Any individual that is incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the
disposition of charges.67
3. Shared Responsibility Payment
Beginning in 2014, persons subject to the Individual Mandate (i.e., those not
exempted under the applicable individual definition described above) who do not
obtain health insurance coverage will have to pay a penalty labeled a “shared
responsibility payment” to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or demonstrate that
they are separately exempt from such penalty.68 The shared responsibility payment
is imposed for each month the individual (or an individual for whom the taxpayer is
liable such as a dependent) fails to have minimum essential health coverage.69 The
penalty is included as an additional payment owed with the individual’s federal
income tax return for the year that the failure occurs.70 For joint return filers, the
spouse is jointly liable for the other spouse’s penalty obligation.71 For children, the
person(s) who can claim a child or another individual as a dependent for tax
purposes is the party responsible for making the shared responsibility payment if
that child or dependent does not have coverage or qualify for an exemption.72
The amount of the shared responsibility payment penalty is based on a
complex formula that is calculated as a percentage of household income with floor
and ceiling thresholds.73 The floor is based on specified dollar amount and the

65. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2012). A “health care sharing ministry” is
generally a Section 501(c)(3) organization whose members share a common set of ethical or
religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs and
without regard to residence. Id.
66. Id. § 5000A(d)(3) (Supp. V 2012). Generally, all United States citizens, permanent
residents and all foreign nationals who are in the United States long enough during a calendar year
to qualify as resident aliens for tax purposes are subject to the Individual Mandate. See IRS Q&A,
supra note 37, at 4.
67. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(4).
68. Id. § 5000A(b)(1).
69. Id. § 5000A(c)(2).
70. Id. § 5000A(b)(2).
71. Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(B).
72. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2012). Although coverage is required, an
individual’s spouse and dependent children do not have to be covered under the same policy or
plan as the individual. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 4.
73. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(c) (establishing that the penalty imposed on any taxpayer is the
lesser of the sum of the monthly penalty amounts determined under § 5000A(c)(2) or an amount
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ceiling is based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay
for qualifying private health insurance.74
Specifically, the amount of the penalty charged to an individual for any tax
year is equal to the sum of the “monthly penalty amounts” in the tax year.75 Such
penalty will generally be the greater of either a flat dollar amount or percentage of
income.76 However, in no case can the penalty be greater than an amount equal to
the national average premium for a “bronze level” qualified health plan that
provides coverage for the applicable family size involved and is offered through the
new health insurance exchanges.77 The average annual health insurance premium
for bronze level coverage is projected to be around $4,800 per year for a single plan
and $12,250 for a family plan.78
The “monthly penalty amount” described above is an amount equal to 1/12 of
the greater of:
(1) the “Flat Dollar Amount” - an amount equal to the lesser of (i) the sum
of the “applicable dollar amounts” ($95 in 2014, $325 in 2015 and $695 in 2016
and years after (children: $47.50, $162.50 and $347.50 respectively)) for all
individuals in the family with respect to whom such failure occurred during such
month, or (ii) 300% of the “applicable dollar amount” for the year,79 or
(2) the “Percentage of Income” - an amount equal to the percentage (1% in
2014, 2% in 2015 and 2.5% in 2016 and years after) of the excess of the taxpayer’s
household income for the tax year over the amount of the Code Section 6012(a)(1)
income tax filing threshold.80

equal to the national average premium for a bronze level qualified health plan offered through the
exchanges).
74. Id. § 5000A(c)(1).
75. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)(A).
76. Id. § 5000A(c)(2) (the monthly penalty will be equal to 1/12 the greater of either (A) an
amount equal to the lesser of the “sum of the applicable dollar amounts for all individuals with
respect to whom such failure occurred during such month, or (ii) 300 percent of the applicable
dollar amount”, or (B) an “amount equal to the following percentage of the excess of the taxable
year over the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer
for the taxable year: (i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014. (ii) 2.0 percent for taxable
years beginning in 2015. (iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning after 2015”).
77. Id. § 5000A(c)(1) (establishing that the amount of the penalty “shall be equal to the lesser
of (A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts . . . or (B) an amount equal to the national average
premium for qualified health plans which have a bronze level coverage”).
78. See DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41331, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND
RELATED INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 7, n.25 (2011) (discussing the cap on
the penalty for an individual who does not maintain minimum essential coverage).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(A) (2011).
80. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).
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For example, in 2016, the penalty per adult will be equal to 2.5% of the
individual’s household income above the filing threshold;81 however, in no case
less than $695 and no more than the national average yearly premium for health
insurance at the bronze level.82 In looking at how this would ultimately play out in
2016 for individuals and those with families, the following examples illustrate the
impact of the penalty in the 2016 tax year:
• A single individual with income less than the filing threshold of $10,250
would be exempt from the penalty since they don’t earn enough income to
file a return.83
• A single individual making $35,000 a year as household income would be
expected to owe a penalty of about $695 for that year if they do not have
health insurance.84
• A married couple with two dependents with income between 80% and
400% of the poverty level and who do not obtain health insurance would
pay a penalty of about $2,085.85
• A single individual without health insurance making $100,000 a year would
likely owe about $2,256.86
• A large family without health insurance with income in excess of $500,000
could owe as much as $12,500 in penalty.87
4. Penalty Exemptions
The Act, in an unusual way, provides for an additional layer of exemptions
for certain individuals to be exempt from payment of the penalty. Even though one
may fall into the “applicable individual” category and be subject to the Individual
Mandate, the penalty provisions provide a separate list of individuals who, even
though they fail to obtain minimum essential coverage, do not have to pay the
81. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(iii).
82. Id. § 5000A(c)(1)–(3)(A).
83. See David Auerbach et al., Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage?
Synthesizing Perspectives from the Literature in Health Economics, Tax Compliance, and
Behavioral Economics 8 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper 2010-05, 2010), available at
working_paper_2010-05-health_insurance_mandate.pdf.
84. See id. (stating that a single person earning between roughly 90% and 300% of the FPL
would be subject to a flat $695 penalty). $35,000 is roughly 300% of the projected 2016 FPL of
$12,000, and would therefore make an uncovered individual earning this amount subject to a flat
dollar penalty rate of $695. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING
UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.pdf.
85. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 8–9.
86. See id. at 8 (stating that a single person whose income exceeds 300% of the projected
2016 FPL, but is less than about $200,000, would be subject to a penalty of 2.5% of his or her
taxable income).
87. Id. at 9.
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shared responsibility payment.88 Those individuals exempt from the penalty fall
into a much larger group than the group of individuals exempt from the Individual
Mandate and include the following:
(1) Individuals who cannot afford coverage. This includes individuals
whose “required contribution” for health coverage for the month (on an annual
basis) exceeds 8% of the individual’s household income for the tax year (i.e., those
who would have to pay more than 8% of their income for health insurance).89 The
“required contribution” amount for an individual is (i) if eligible to purchase
coverage through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion of the annual
premium which would be paid by the individual for self-coverage, or (ii) if eligible
only to purchase minimum essential coverage in the individual market, the annual
premium for the lowest cost bronze plan available in the individual market through
the state insurance exchange where the individual resides, reduced by the amount
of the tax credit allowable under Code Section 36B.90
(2) Individuals with income below the tax-filing threshold. This includes
any individual whose household income for the tax year is less than the minimum
amount of the Code’s income tax return filing requirement.91 Depending on the
filing status of the individual, such amount is roughly 80 to 90% of the FPL.92 This
provision essentially exempts those who have not earned enough income to be
required to file a federal income tax return.93
(3) Members of Indian tribes.94
(4) Individuals with short coverage gaps. This includes any individual that
was not covered by minimum essential coverage for a continuous period of less
than three months.95 Only one ninety-day period is allowed in a year.96
(5) Individuals designated a hardship. This includes any individual who is
determined by HHS to have suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to
88. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)–(5) (2011).
89. Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(A).
90. Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
91. Id. § 5000A(e)(2) (2011); see 26 U.S.C. §6012(a)(1) (2011) for filing requirements.
92. The CBO estimates that these amounts would be about $10,000 for a single filer and
$19,000 for a married couple in 2016. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT
SUPREME COURT DECISION 3 n.5 (July 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf.
93. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2).
94. Id. § 5000A(e)(3) (2011). See 26 U.S.C. § 45A(c)(6) (2013).
95. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(4)(A) (2011).
96. Id. § 5000A(e)(4)(B)(iii).
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obtain health insurance coverage.97 Specifically, a state insurance exchange has
certified that the individual has suffered a hardship that makes him or her unable to
obtain coverage.98
The effect of the Act’s exemptions is that it created two classes of individuals
that ultimately will not have to pay any penalty: (i) those exempted from the
“applicable individual” definition and (ii) those exempt from the “shared
responsibility payment” penalty.99
5. IRS Administration and Procedure
The shared responsibility payment penalty will be generally assessed and
collected by the IRS in the same manner as any other penalty assessable by the
IRS.100 However, individuals who fail to timely pay the penalty cannot be subject
to any criminal prosecution or other penalty by the IRS with respect to such failure
to pay.101 In addition, the IRS cannot file a notice of lien with respect to any
property of an individual who fails to pay the penalty or levy on any such
property.102 One important enforcement tool that the IRS will be able to use is to
offset any tax refunds owed to a taxpayer by the amount owed to the IRS for the
shared responsibility payment penalty.103
Demonstrating any exemption from the minimum essential coverage
requirement or penalty will be necessary for the effective administration of the
Individual Mandate. Individuals claiming a religious conscience exemption or
certain hardship exemption generally will need to obtain an exemption certificate
from the insurance exchange.104 Those individuals who are a member of an Indian

97. Id. § 5000A(e)(5).
98. ACA Statutory Exemptions from the Requirement to Obtain Minimum Essential Coverage,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
health/small-business-health-insurance.aspx#Exemptions.
99. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2653 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act exempts three classes of
people from the “applicable individual” definition and also creates a separate set of exemptions
excusing liability for certain individuals failing to maintain minimum coverage).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1).
101. Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(A).
102. Id. § 5000A(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (stating the Secretary will not file a “notice of lien with
respect to any property of a taxpayer by reason of failure to pay the penalty imposed by this
section or levy any such property with respect to such failure”).
103. Howard Gleckman, Obamacare: Tax Or Penalty? Call It What You Want, But IRS Won't
Be
Able
To
Collect
It,
FORBES
(July
3,
2012,
2:42
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/07/03/some-tax-few-will-face-obamacare-uninsuredpenalty-and-irs-hamstrung-to-collect/ (stating the IRS’s only tool for collecting penalty will be
subtracting penalty from a refund it owes penalized taxpayers).
104. See IRS Q&A, supra note 37, at 1 (stating religious conscience and hardship exemptions
are only granted by going to Health Insurance Marketplace and applying for an exemption
certificate).
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tribe or health care sharing ministry, or are incarcerated may claim exemption on
their federal income tax return or by obtaining an exemption certificate from the
insurance exchange.105 Those individuals claiming exemption due to unaffordable
coverage, a short coverage gap, certain hardships or who are not lawfully present in
the United States can only claim such exemption on their federal income tax
return.106 The exemption for those under the filing threshold is available
automatically and requires no action.107
The IRS will receive information on enrollees covered under a health plan
from insurance companies and other payers each year, with similar information
also sent to those insured.108 The IRS will receive information on those who
receive a hardship waiver, affordability exemption, or other type of exemption by
the individual either claiming an exemption on their individual tax return or filing
an exemption form.109 The IRS will then use this information to identify those
individuals who have not complied with the Individual Mandate and failed to pay
the penalty.110
6. Transition Relief
The IRS has provided transition relief from the shared responsibility payment
penalty for certain individuals who are eligible to enroll in an employer-sponsored
health plan with a plan year other than a calendar year if the plan year begins in
2013 and ends in 2014.111 This transition relief for such individuals begins January
1, 2014, and continues through the month in which the particular non-calendar plan
year ends.112
C.

The Medicaid Expansion

There is no deadline for state enrollment in the Medicaid Expansion, however
there is currently nothing to indicate that states who choose not to enroll in 2014
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Final Regulations on Information Reporting of Minimum Essential Coverage, 79 Fed.
Reg. 13220 (March 10, 2014) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. 6055), available at
https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-05051. See Barbara Marquand, How the Feds Will Know if You
Have
Health
Insurance,
CAPITAL
BLUECROSS.COM
(Apr.
3,
2013),
https://www.capbluecross.com/wps/wcm/connect/cbc-public/cbc/healthcarereform/fedsarticle.
109. How do I Qualify for an Exemption from the Fee for Not Having Health Coverage?,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/exemptions/ (last visited May 16, 2014).
110. See Marquand, supra note 108.
111. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN: TRANSITION RELIEF FOR
EMPLOYEES AND RELATED INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE TO ENROLL IN ELIGIBLE EMPLOYERSPONSORED HEALTH PLANS FOR NON-CALENDAR PLAN YEARS THAT BEGIN IN 2013 AND END IN
2014 NOTICE 2013–42, 61 (July 15, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb1329.pdf.
112. Id. at 62.
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will readily change their minds.113 As of August 1, 2013, twenty-seven states had
decided to participate or are leaning toward participation in the Medicaid
Expansion.114 Four states are seeking approval to use federal funds to expand
coverage under current state programs.115 Many of the states that have chosen not
to participate cite budget concerns.116 Further, many report that insurance
premiums are actually rising and moving toward unaffordability, and that employer
subsidies may be less helpful than anticipated.117 Those states participating in the
Medicaid Expansion and currently implementing preparatory programs report
successes, but also report expected increases in Medicaid enrollment of 20101%.118 Unfortunately, many of the states that have chosen not to participate have
large populations of poor and uninsured adults.119 Resultantly, when the Act is
fully realized in 2016, only slightly more than half of the states will currently be

113. See Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, But Less Justice:
Widening Health Disparities After National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 481, 483 (2013) (noting that “[t]hough states face no
firm deadline for opting into the expansion, there is no reason to think participation rates will be
materially higher in future years than in 2014, when funding will be at its most generous level.”).
114. See Where Each State Stands on ACA's Medicaid Expansion: A Roundup of What Each
State's Leadership Has Said About Their Medicaid Plans, ADVISORY BD. CO. (June 14, 2013),
http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap (listing each state that has
decided to expand Medicaid coverage or is currently leaning towards expanding Medicaid
coverage).
115. Id.
116. See Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion: 26 States, D.C. Expanding Medicaid,
ADVISORY BD. CO. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.advisory.com/_apps/
dailybriefingprint?i={C14C9308-36AF-401F-8802-334CE6B5D6AF} (stating that six state
governors have specifically cited budget concerns when addressing their refusal to expand).
117. See, e.g., Lara Hoffmans, ACA’s Not-So-Great Rate Shock Debate, FORBES (June 4,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larahoffmans/2013/06/04/acas-not-so-great-rate-shock-debate/
(reporting that in states with their own exchanges, such as California and Oregon, plan premiums
are likely to double); Bruce Rogers, More Surprise from the Affordable Care Act, FORBES (May
31,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucerogers/2013/05/31/more-surprises-from-theaffordable-care-act/ (discussing design limitations of employer subsidies within the ACA such as
“no employer subsidies are required for the worker’s children or spouse” and that certain tax
credits are available “only if neither spouse is offered and employer-subsidized policy”).
118. TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., THE URBAN INST., ARE STATE MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE PROGRAMS READY FOR 2014? A REVIEW OF EIGHT STATES, tbl.2 (May 2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412826-Are-State-Medicaid-Managed-Care-ProgramsReady-for-2014.pdf.
119. See Parento & Gostin, supra note 113, at 504 (“Among states that have decided against
participating in the expansion, many have rates of uninsured considerably higher than the national
average . . . . ”); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP: UNINSURED POOR
ADULTS IN STATES THAT DO NOT EXPAND MEDICAID (Oct. 23, 2013), http://kff.org/healthreform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expandmedicaid/ (reporting that in states that are not participating in expansion, nearly five million poor
and uninsured adults that will fall into coverage gaps between Medicaid and Marketplace
premium tax credits, making it very difficult for the poor and uninsured to obtain coverage).
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participating, and the costs of national insurance will be dispersed over a much
smaller population.120
D.

Employer Mandate: The “Play or Pay” Requirement

The Act requires large employers of fifty or more full-time equivalent
employees provide affordable healthcare coverage to full-time employees.121 This
requirement was intended to become effective in 2014, and provided for federal
assistance in order to verify that employers were offering appropriate healthcare as
part of the subsidy eligibility verification for state-based insurance exchanges.122
However, due to delays in the availability of federal assistance to ensure employer
compliance, the requirement for employers to provide healthcare will not become
effective until 2015.123 Because employers will not be required by law to provide
affordable healthcare options to employees at the Act’s outset, many have
speculated that the number of uninsured may rise as a result.124
Others, however, speculate the delay may stimulate enrollment in the health
exchanges. According to one report, the success of the Act is:
largely dependent on how many people are willing to buy health plans
through the government exchanges. Most of the people affected by
Obama’s decision to delay the employer mandate to provide health
care will now be eligible to use the exchange . . . . An increase in
enrollment, particularly by young people such as restaurant workers,
will help the exchanges by making their pool of customers less risky
to cover. That could lead to lower premiums starting in 2015, said Jay
Angoff, a Mehri & Skalet law partner who had been director of

120. See Editorial Board, Millions Will Remain Uninsured Because of Blocked Medicaid
Expansion
in
States,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
15,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/millions-will-remain-uninsured-because-of-blockedmedicaid-expansion-in-states/2013/11/15/9629bcfa-4b1c-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html
(reporting that Medicaid expansion has been blocked in half the states).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)-(c)(2)(A) (2011).
122. Mark J. Mazur, Treasury Notes: Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful,
Thoughtful
Manner,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
TREASURY
(July
2,
2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/pages/continuing-to-implement-the-aca-in-a-carefulthoughtful-manner-.aspx (stating the Obama administration will delay the start of the employer
and insurer reporting mandates).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Crucial Rule Is Delayed a Year for Obama’s
Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/us/politics/obamaadministration-to-delay-health-law-requirement-until-2015.html?ref=politics (quoting George
Washington Law Professor Sara Rosenbaum, “This step could significantly reduce the number of
uninsured people who will gain coverage in 2014.”).
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insurance oversight at the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services under Obama.125
However, many experts remain worried.126 The success of the Act largely depends
on whether young and healthy individuals will relinquish part of their disposable
income to pay for insurance. HHS figures shows nationwide there are 11.6 million
people between ages eighteen and thirty-four who are uninsured.127 Many young
people may see insurance as a luxury, and they may be content not having it.128 A
failure to convince them otherwise will drive up the rates for others.129
Despite such predictions, a recent study by the Urban Institute, using a
methodology comparable to that of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), has
found that the delay in implementation of the Employer Mandate is likely to have
negligible results on the number of uninsured, non-elderly individuals.130
According to the study, the number of Americans uninsured under the Act without
the Employer Mandate is predicted to be 28,264,000 individuals or 10.2% of the
population, which is only 0.1% more than the 10.1% of the population (27,928,000
people) predicted to remain uninsured under the Act with the Employer Mandate
fully intact.131 Instead, the data seems to indicate that the real heart of the Act is
the Individual Mandate, which, if eliminated from the Act would leave a startling
41,969,000 Americans uninsured, or 15.1% of the population.132 It is possible that
the Employer Mandate is somewhat inconsequential in shaping employer policy,

125. Alex Wayne, Obama’s Employer Health Care Delay May Goose Exchange Enrollment,
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/obama-s-employerhealth-care-delay-may-goose-exchange-enrollment.html.
126. See Maggie Fox, Delay in Health Insurance Law Won’t Affect Many, Experts Say, NBC
NEWS (July 3, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/delay-health-insurance-lawwont-affect-many-experts-say-6C10527171 (discussing the opposing views between experts on
the effect of the employer health insurance delay).
127. Christopher Weaver & Louise Radnofsky, New Health-Care Law’s Success Rests on the
Young,
WALL
S T.
J.
(July
25,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324263404578613700273320428.
128. See Kelli Kennedy, Health Insurers Fear Young People Will Opt Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 5, 2103), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/health-insurers-fear-young-people-will-opt-out
(discussing the concerns of many young Americans who do not see health insurance as a
necessity).
129. See Lewis Krauskopf, Obamacare May Get Sick if Young Americans Don’t Sign Up,
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/12/us-usa-healthcareenrollment-idUSBREA0B07Y20140112 (discussing the need for young healthy adults to sign up
for health insurance in order to offset the costs of the elderly).
130. See Linda Blumberg et al., It’s No Contest: The ACA’s Employer Mandate Has Far Less
Effect on Coverage and Costs Than the Individual Mandate, URBAN INSTITUTE 1, 3 (July 2013),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412865-ACA-Employer-Mandate.pdf.
131. Id. at 2 tbl.1, 3.
132. See id. at 3.
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which is instead shaped by the demands of high-quality employees.133 That
demand is in turn motivated by the Individual Mandate, which, although it seems to
be the most effective means of promoting healthcare consumption, is still not
completely effective.
E.

Health Insurance Exchanges

One significant feature of the Act is the creation of health insurance
exchanges in every state. These insurance exchanges referred to as “Health
Insurance Marketplaces”134 or “Affordable Insurance Exchanges”135 opened for
enrollment in October of 2013.136 The goal of these insurance exchanges is to
assist individuals in obtaining minimum essential coverage and potentially provide
financial assistance to cover the cost of such insurance.137 In addition, a function of
the insurance exchanges will be to grant exemption certificates to those individuals
who qualify.138
F.

Projections on the Individual Mandate and Penalty

The CBO originally estimated that, even with the Act in place, about thirty
million individuals in America would be uninsured in 2016.139 The CBO estimated
this group would be mostly composed of (i) individuals who are unauthorized
immigrants, (ii) individuals who will be eligible for Medicaid but fail to enroll, (iii)
individuals who will be eligible for subsidies, but do not utilize them, (iv)
individuals exempt from the Individual Mandate and (v) individuals who will be

133. See id. at 4 (discussing the relative unchanged premium spending by employers when the
Employer Mandate is dropped); see also Decision to Delay Employer Mandate Will Cause More
Employers to Drop Coverage, PRWEB (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.prweb.com/releases/healthinsurance-exchange/private-exchange/prweb10899757.htm (statement of Josh Hilgers)
(“[E]mployers offer benefits for a variety of reasons . . . but the number one reason is to attract
and retain employees.”).
134. What
is
the
Health
Insurance
Marketplace?,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-health-insurance-marketplace/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
135. Creating a New Competitive Health Insurance Marketplace, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Marketplace-Grants/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2014).
136. State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/state-marketplaces.html
(last
updated Oct. 1, 2013).
137. See supra text accompanying note 3.
138. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions; Eligibility for
Exemptions; Miscellaneous Minimum Essential Coverage Provisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,494,
39,524 (July 1, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 and 156).
139. PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
supra note 84, at 1.
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subject to the Individual Mandate, but do not comply.140 The number of people
estimated to fall within the Individual Mandate’s exemption for unauthorized
immigrants and the penalty exemption for members of Indian tribes, low income
individuals, and unaffordable coverage individuals was estimated to be around
eighteen to nineteen million individuals.141 According to those figures, a majority
of the thirty million uninsured individuals would not have been subject to the
Individual Mandate or the shared responsibility payment penalty.142
When the Act was passed in 2010, the CBO had originally projected that, of
the number of people ultimately subject to the Individual Mandate and penalty
provision, approximately 3.9 million individuals would pay the shared
responsibility penalty rather than purchase the required amount of health
insurance.143 After the Court’s decision, the CBO increased that number to 5.9
million people who will pay a penalty rather than obtain health insurance.144 About
85% of that increase is a result of changes to the CBO’s baseline projections,
including the effects of new legislation and economic outlook changes.145 The
remaining 15% of the increase is a direct result of the increase in the number of
uninsured people expected to pay the penalty based on the Court’s decision on the
Medicaid Expansion.146
Estimates were also provided by the CBO in terms of the monetary effect of
the shared responsibility payment penalty that individuals would have to pay.147
The shared responsibility payment penalty will generate revenue in the billions per
year.148 Specifically, the CBO now estimates that penalty payments by uninsured
individuals will produce $2 billion in revenue in 2015, $4 billion per year in 2016
through 2018, and $5 billion per year in 2019-2022.149 By 2022, $32 billion in total

140. See id. at 1–2 (discussing those who will not be insured by 2016); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S MAY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2013-05-ACA.pdf (estimating the number of uninsured
nonelderly people under the ACA).
141. PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
supra note 84, at 1.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 2 tbl.1 (displaying the estimated distribution of Individual Mandate penalties
under the ACA).
148. See id. (showing that the CBO is predicating $6.9 billion total penalty payments in the
year 2016).
149. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT 2 tb.1 (2014), at 2 tb.1 available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43900-2014-04-ACAtables2.pdf. [hereinafter INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT]
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revenue is now expected to accrue from the shared responsibility payment
penalty.150
Unfortunately, new studies and predictions indicate that the number of
Americans likely to remain without or lose health insurance once the health
insurance exchanges go into effect has increased.151 Of those in states that have
chosen not to implement the Medicaid Expansion, approximately 90% of the
uninsured are predicted to be below 138% of the FPL.152 In states that will have
adopted the Medicaid Expansion, 40% of Medicaid-eligible residents are predicted
to remain uninsured in 2016.153 Furthermore, federal revenue is likely to decrease
due to the delay of the Employer Mandate.154 The Government is anticipated to
lose approximately $3.7 billion in employer penalties during the extra year it will
take to implement the Employer Mandate.155 This is the most dramatic effect of the
delay, which is otherwise predicted to have negligible results.
After full implementation of the Act, a significant number of people will now
likely remain uninsured.156 The five states that are expected to have the highest
uninsurance rates are: Texas (where 191.3 in every 1,000 residents will not have
insurance); Louisiana (167.8 in every 1,000 residents); Georgia (155.3 in every
1,000 residents); South Carolina (152.6 in every 1,000 residents); and Alaska
(142.2 in every 1,000 residents).157 None of these states has elected to participate
in the Medicaid Expansion.158 Some states, however, are expected to have higher
rates of success. The lowest uninsurance rates are expected to occur in states
adopting the Medicaid Expansion, namely, Massachusetts (where just 16.9 in every
1,000 residents will not have insurance); Hawaii (38.1 in every 1,000 residents);
District of Columba (42.7 in every 1,000 residents); Connecticut (45.1 in every
1,000 residents); and North Dakota (45.7 in every 1,000 residents).159 Some results
are mixed; Nevada is expected to see a 50.25% reduction in its uninsured
150. See id. (adding the total number of estimated penalties paid by 2022 is projected to be $55
billion).
151. See Rachel Nardin et al., The Uninsured After Implementation of the Affordable Care Act:
A Demographic And Geographic Analysis, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 6, 2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/06/06/the-uninsured-after-implementation-of-the-affordablecare-act-a-demographic-and-geographic-analysis/ (estimating that the Supreme Court’s decision to
allow states to opt-out of Medicaid expansion could increase the number of uninsured Americans
by 1.2 million).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Blumberg et al., supra note 130, at 4.
155. Id.
156. See PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT, supra note 84, at 1.
157. Juliette Mullin, et al., Which States Will Have the Most Uninsured Residents in 2016?,
ADVISORY BD. CO. (June 18, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/blog/2013/06/whichstates-will-have-the-most-uninsured-residents-in-2016.
158. Id.
159. Id.

	
  

240

	
  

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 17

population after it implements the Medicaid Expansion, although 109.5 in every
1,000 residents are still expected to remain uninsured.160
Since the issuance of the one-year delay of the Employer Mandate, there is
also now a call to delay the Individual Mandate.161 Various bills in Congress have
been prepared to implement such a delay, although the success of such legislation
may be unlikely.162 Many, including the Obama Administration, have indicated
that the impact of a delay of the Individual Mandate will cause an increase in health
insurance premium rates and increase the number of uninsured and undermine the
key elements of the Act.163
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Act came before the Supreme Court in 2012.164 The Supreme Court
considered the issue in several contexts, including the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Congressional Taxing Authority before deciding the issue under the Taxing and
Spending Power.165 There was strong opposition to the decision by a four-Justice
dissent.166
A.

The Decision: Overview

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was argued before
the Supreme Court in March of 2012 and decided in June of 2012.167 Although the
Act itself is over nine hundred pages, only two provisions were challenged before
the Court: the Individual Mandate and the Medicaid Expansion.168 At issue here is
the Individual Mandate, which was challenged in four different circuits.169 The
160. Id.
161. See Emily Lee, Costs of Delaying the Individual Mandate, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct.
30, 2013), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2013/10/30/78415/the-costsof-delaying-the-individual-mandate/ (stating that members of Congress are seeking to delay the
Individual Mandate).
162. See John Parkinson, House Votes to Delay Employer and Individual Mandates by One
Year, ABC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/house-votes-todelay-employer-and-individual-mandates-by-one-year/ (discussing the numerous unsuccessful
attempts to delay or repeal the Individual Mandate).
163. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2667 & H.R. 2668 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr2667r_20130716.pdf
(stating that the House’s attempts at delaying the ACA would increase the costs of health
insurance and the number of uninsured Americans).
164. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
165. See id. at 2582, 2601.
166. See id. at 2677 (stating in a dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito that they would hold “the Act invalid in its entirety”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2566.
168. See id. at 2580.
169. See id. at 2580–81 (stating that the Eleventh, Sixth, D.C., and Fourth Circuits heard
challenges to the Individual Mandate).
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Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the Individual Mandate, and the Fourth
Circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act barred review at this point.170 The
decision on review before the Court here was a decision by the Eleventh Circuit
declaring (i) the Individual Mandate in excess of Congressional authority and (ii)
the Medicaid Expansion as an acceptable exercise.171 The appellate decision stood
in contrast to the Florida district court decision in favor of the plaintiffs, including
twenty-five states, which struck down the Act in its entirety.172
The Supreme Court was sharply divided on the case.173 Chief Justice Roberts
authored the Majority Opinion, which held that the Individual Mandate was
allowed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but it was won by a slim
margin.174 Justice Roberts also authored individual opinions addressing the
Individual Mandate in other contexts, such as the Commerce Clause.175 Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in the Chief Justice’s opinion with
respect to the Facts, the non-applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, and the
Individual Mandate as construed under the Taxing and Spending Clause.176 Justice
Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion arguing to uphold the Act in its entirety under
every aspect of Congressional authority, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in
which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in part.177 Justice Scalia wrote for the
dissent, in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined, arguing that the Act
should be struck down in its entirety.178 Justice Thomas also wrote a solitary
dissent.179
B.

The Anti-Injunction Act

Before proceeding to the merits, the majority first dismissed the AntiInjunction Act as inapplicable.180 The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits judicial review
or impediment of any effort to collect a tax, and Amicus argued that this barred

170. See id. at 2581 (explaining that the “Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit upheld the mandate
as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power,” and the “Fourth Circuit determined that the
Anti–Injunction Act prevents courts from considering the merits”).
171. Id. at 2582.
172. Id. at 2580.
173. See id. at 2609, 2677 (explaining that Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan
agree with Chief Justice Roberts’ conclusions regarding the Anti–Injunction Act and that the
minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power, while Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissent calling “the Act invalid in its entirety”).
174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
175. See id. at 2583–84.
176. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
177. See id.
178. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2584 (majority opinion).
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review of the Individual Mandate.181 However, the Court disagreed, holding that
the Individual Mandate was in fact a penalty rather than a tax due mostly to the
classification afforded it by Congress.182 Congress in this case explicitly failed to
categorize or label the penalty as a tax, despite having evidenced a willingness to
do so elsewhere in the Act.183 Because the Anti-Injunction Act is a creation of
Congress, the Court deferred to Congress’s discretion to dictate what does and does
not fall under its scope.184 The majority interpreted the legislative intent inherent in
the language of the Act to communicate a relatively clear desire to consider the
Individual Mandate as a penalty, and thus not subject to the strictures of the AntiInjunction Act.185
C.

Congressional Taxing Authority

Congress has the power under Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution to lay and
collect Taxes and Duties.186 This is a broad authority, and the Court has
historically refused to significantly limit that authority except in the case of taxes
that are in fact punitive measures.187 There are only two forms of tax: direct taxes
and indirect taxes.188 Direct taxes are the subject of the Direct Tax Clause of the
Constitution, providing that such taxes must be collected in proportion to the
Census.189 Taxes taken under this authority must be apportioned amongst the states
in relation to their populations rather than assessed individually.190 Direct taxes
have historically been very difficult to define, and have been limited by a number
of key precedents.191 Examples would include capitations and real property taxes
among others.192 Indirect taxes, on the other hand, are practically unlimited in their
scope, and seem to include practically every other type of tax not explicitly
considered direct by precedent.193

181. See id. at 2582.
182. See id. at 2583–84.
183. See id. at 2583.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
187. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
188. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (proclaiming that “Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes,” which are direct taxes, and “Duties, Imposts and Excises,” which are indirect
taxes).
189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
191. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (discussing the
history of the Court’s interpretation of the Direct Tax Clause).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 2596 (citing a variety of taxes classified as “regulatory”).
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National Federation cites several relevant precedents.194 First, the Court
notes that in 1881 a poll tax was determined to be a direct tax.195 In 1796 it was
determined that a tax on carriages was not.196 Taxes on personal property and
income from such were once considered direct taxes, as well as taxes on real
estate.197 However, the Sixteenth Amendment later disagreed with respect to
personal property.198 These limited categories have so far prescribed the only
categories in which Congress may impose a direct tax proportionate to the
population of each state.199
Here, the majority made the determination that the Individual Mandate was in
no way a direct tax, and therefore fell under the broad category of an indirect tax if
it were indeed a tax at all.200 As an indirect tax, the Individual Mandate fell under
the Taxing Authority of Congress without further Constitutional limitation.201 The
Taxing Authority, as opposed to the Commerce Authority, proved key to the
survival of the Act due precisely to its breadth and scope.202 In the Court’s
decision, both the broad nature of the Taxing Authority and the restriction in scope
to monetary duties and penalties were key arguments in favor of the Individual
Mandate.203
D.

The Individual Mandate

Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion discussing the Individual
Mandate under Congressional Taxing and Spending Power.204 He first articulated
several reasons as to why the Individual Mandate may be construed as a tax,205 and
then proceeded to explain why this was an acceptable use of Congressional
authority.206 In defining the Individual Mandate as a tax, the majority notes that it
has the qualities of a tax: it is paid to the IRS, along with annual taxes, and thereby
produces Government revenue.207 The Court distinguished the tax from an
effective punishment or penalty based on precedent: it noted that the shared
194. See id. at 2598.
195. Id. at 2598 (citing Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596–98 (1881)).
196. Id. at 2598 (citing Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.)).
197. Id. (citing Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895)).
198. Id. (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–219 (1920)).
199. See id. (stating that Article I, § 9, clause 4 of the Constitution “means that any ‘direct Tax’
must be apportioned so that each State pays in proportion to its population”).
200. See id. at 2599.
201. See id. at 2600.
202. See id. (stating that “the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater than its power to
regulate commerce,” and “[b]ecause the Constitution permits such a tax,” it is not [the Court’s]
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2577.
205. Id. at 2594–97.
206. Id. at 2597–600.
207. See id. at 2594.
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responsibility payment was a tenable, perhaps more cost-effective alternative to
purchasing insurance; that there was no scienter requirement (requiring a knowing
violation of the law); and that it was collected as a normal tax by the IRS.208
Finally, the opinion indicated that taxes that influence behavior are acceptable, so
long as they are not punishments for certain acts.209 Here, there are no negative
legal consequences for failing to maintain health insurance, and payment fulfills all
of an individual’s obligations under the law.210
The Court was not swayed by the fact that Congress did not directly label the
payment as a tax, arguing that the payment was defined by its nature rather than by
labels.211 Further, the Court held that any determinations made for the purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act were, conversely, based solely on Congressional labels
rather than nature, and thus were inapplicable here.212 This neatly dismissed the
contradiction of labeling the Individual Mandate as other than a tax for purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act.213 Finally, the Court determined that the tax was
acceptable Constitutionally as an indirect tax.214
The Court attempted to assuage any doubts similar to those raised in regard to
the Commerce Clause discussion. First, it noted that the Constitution does not
guarantee that inactivity will result in a lack of taxation.215 Second, it was held that
this particular usage was not overwhelmingly punitive and that the payment may be
defined under the narrowest definition of an acceptable tax.216 Third, the majority
stated that Congressional taxing power was more limited than its regulatory power,
as the power to tax was only a power to collect funds, not a power to compel or
punish beyond forced payment.217 For these reasons, the Court held that the
Individual Mandate was Constitutionally acceptable, and that therefore the Court
had no authority to “pass on its wisdom or fairness.”218
E. The Medicaid Expansion
The Chief Justice also authored an opinion regarding the Medicaid
Expansion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.219 Justice Ginsburg also

208. Id. at 2595–96.
209. See id. at 2596.
210. Id. at 2596–97.
211. See id. at 2598.
212. See id. at 2594.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 2600.
215. Id. at 2599.
216. See id. at 2599–600.
217. Id. at 2600.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 2601–09 (opining that the Medicaid expansion violates the Constitution because
it threatens states to accept the expansion program or lose funds for their existing Medicaid
program).
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filed an opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurring in that judgment but
concurring and dissenting in part.220 The Chief Justice’s opinion scrutinized the
Medicaid Expansion as a product of the Congressional spending authority under the
Spending Clause.221 He noted that the Court has previously recognized limits on
that authority, which he cited as being similar to a contractual authority.222
Referencing the merits of federalism and state sovereignty, the Chief Justice
stressed the need for knowing voluntariness when states contract with the federal
government for funding provided by Spending Clause legislation.223
He
emphasized that undue influence in such legislation undermines state sovereignty
and the federal system of government.224 He found the Act to be an unduly
coercive “gun to the head” of states, which intruded on state autonomy by
threatening the loss of substantial portions of state budgets if they failed to comply
with legislation that Congress could not enact directly under its enumerated
powers.225
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Medicaid Expansion in its entirety was
within Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.226 She noted that Medicaid
has been expanded a number of times over the years, and thus that the recent
expansion was not, as the Chief Justice argued, unforeseeable.227 She also found it
relevant that Congress was not required to provide funding under its spending
power, and that it was empowered to do so in pursuit of the general welfare as it
sees fit.228 A majority of the Court felt that states’ reliance on Medicaid prohibited
Congress from altering the nature of the legislation too drastically based on a
contract theory.229 Justice Ginsburg, however, felt that states had no right to
anticipated funds, and that Congress had an unadulterated right to alter the
preconditions for receipt of those funds at any point through legal legislation.230
Although she disagreed with the Chief Justice’s opinion as to the Medicaid
Expansion’s undue influence, Justice Ginsburg joined in his judgment because he
voted only to strike down the mandatory aspect of the Medicaid Expansion rather
than the whole Act.231

220. See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
221. See id. at 2601–09 (majority opinion).
222. See id. at 2602.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 2604.
226. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
227. See id. at 2630.
228. See id. at 2633, 2641.
229. See id. at 2641.
230. See id. at 2633, 2641.
231. See id. at 2641–42.
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F. The Dissent
Justice Scalia and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined in a joint
dissent.232
The dissent argued that the Individual Mandate (i) exceeded
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,233 (ii) was a penalty rather
than a tax and thus that consideration under the taxing power was irrelevant,234 and
(iii) that the same arguments permitted review under the Anti-Injunction Act.235
The dissenters further concluded that the Medicaid Expansion was impermissibly
coercive under the Spending Power,236 that these components were so critical to the
Act as a whole that they could not be severed,237 and that the Act itself must be
deemed unconstitutional on the whole.238 Finally, they noted that the majority’s
construction of the Act so as to be constitutionally permissible exceeded the
boundaries of judicial authority.239
In regard to the taxing power, the joint dissenters believed that interpretation
under this authority was improper because the language of the Individual Mandate
clearly indicated that it was a mandate rather than a tax.240 They relied on
precedent to determine that it was a mandate with an associated collectible penalty
rather than a tax, as well as the wording of the statute (“the individual shall
ensure”).241 They further noted that the statute differentiated between those exempt
from the penalty and those exempt from the Individual Mandate itself.242 They felt
it was error to construe what Congress actually did do, create a mandate with an
associated penalty, as something that it might have permissibly done—create a
healthcare tax.243 They also indicated that penalties are not associated with things
that are lawful or correct, that is, by penalizing an act through statute the act is
made unlawful.244 As such, the dissenters concluded that the Individual Mandate

232. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 2648–50.
234. See id. at 2651–55.
235. Id. at 2656.
236. Id. at 2666.
237. See id. at 2671–75 (arguing that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are not
severable from the Act’s major provisions, which include insurance regulations and taxes,
reductions in reimbursements to hospitals and other reductions in Medicare expenditures, health
insurance exchanges and their federal subsidies, and the employer-responsibility assessment).
238. Id. at 2677.
239. See id. at 2676 (describing the Court’s interpretation of the Act as “judicial
overreaching.”).
240. See id. at 2655 (“[T]o say that the Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax is not to
interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”).
241. See id. at 2652–53 (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co.). 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012).
242. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2653.
243. Id. at 2651, 2655.
244. See id. at 2652 (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co., 65 S. Ct. 247, 252
(1861)).
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was necessarily not a tax, and therefore could not fall under the taxing power.245
Although they noted the Court’s obligation to construe statute as constitutional
when possible, they drew the line on such construction at what seemed to him to be
blatant reinterpretation.246
Finally, the dissent briefly indicated that for the same reasons the Individual
Mandate was not a tax for purposes of the taxing power, namely plain language and
precedential tax-penalty distinctions, it was not a tax for purposes of the AntiInjunction Act.247 They indicated that the majority construction that used the same
evidence to declare the Individual Mandate both a tax for the purposes of the
Constitution but not a tax in regard to the Anti-Injunction Act was erroneous
“verbal wizardry.”248
The issue of universal healthcare itself became particularly relevant and
controversial in the 2012 election cycle,249 and in spite of the President’s reelection many Republicans continue to oppose the Act as a matter of policy and
political doctrine.250 There was substantial expectation that the Court would strike
down the case in its entirety, and its failure to do so was regarded by some as a
failure to properly comport itself in the “political” process.251 The Chief Justice
especially has received a great deal of negative attention for his role in deciding the
case.252 Further, there is substantial dissatisfaction with the Court as a whole for a
decision that many feel neglects their proper role as the ultimate decision-making
body.253 However, the majority clearly states the Court’s opinion that, should
legislation be Constitutional, the Court ought not properly interfere.254 The
majority stated that the Court was not meant to stand as a bulwark between the
people and the fruits of their political decisions, good or bad.255

245. Id. at 2655.
246. See id. 132 S. Ct. at 2655.
247. See 2655–56.
248. Id. at 2656.
249. See Kate Pickert, What Obama’s Re-election Means for Health Care, TIME.COM (Nov. 9,
2012, 7:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/health/obama-reelection-healthcare-time/
(explaining how the results of the 2012 election would impact the health care system, as Mitt
Romney vowed to stop the implementation and Obama vowed to have full implementation by
2014).
250. See Anne-Laure Beaussier, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: The Victory
of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 741, 747 (2012).
251. See Dan Eggen, Roberts’s Health-Care Decision Stuns Many But Is In Line With His
Outlook, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/robertss-healthcare-decision-stuns-many-but-in-line-with-his-outlook/2012/06/28/gJQAFdv19V_story.html
(“The decision stunned legal observers on both sides . . . .”).
252. See id. (“Roberts [was] the focus of heated invective from conservative activists and some
Republican members of Congress, who derided him as a ‘traitor.’”).
253. Id.
254. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
255. Id. at 2579.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE
ACT’S IMPLEMENTATION
After the Court’s decision, there is no question that the Act was impacted.
The question in relation to the Individual Mandate is precisely how.256 It is
arguable that there now essentially is no legal mandate, and possible that the Act’s
goal of increased insurance participation will now not be met. If so, there may be
further healthcare legislation under the taxing power or an unexpected response by
HHS. The public perception of the Court’s decision is also a key component.
A.

Is There Really Still a Legal Individual Mandate
Requiring the Purchase of Health Insurance?

In reviewing the shared responsibility payment penalty, the Supreme Court
noted that for most individuals the amount due under the penalty will be
significantly less than the price of acquiring health insurance coverage since the
penalty was capped.257 As a result, the Court believed an individual could make the
“reasonable” financial decision to pay the penalty instead of purchasing health
insurance.258 The Court did not believe the “tax,” as it labeled the penalty,
restricted the lawful choice of an individual on whether to partake or forgo in the
activity subject to it.259 The Court’s ultimate reading of the Individual Mandate
was that it was only imposing a tax on individuals without health insurance and
was reasonable under the taxing power.260 Basically, in the Court’s eyes, those
individuals subject to the Individual Mandate have two choices: (1) buy health
insurance and pay lower taxes, or (2) not buy health insurance and pay higher
taxes.261
There are some who now argue that the Court’s taxing power ruling
essentially removes the “mandate” from the Act’s Individual Mandate requirement
in that the provisions requiring minimum coverage no longer exist as a direct legal
command to individuals to purchase health insurance.262 This would be based on
the view that the legal command compelling individuals to buy health insurance

256. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and the
Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118–19 (2012) (arguing that the fate of the
Affordable Care Act after Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius was a factor of which opinion
controlled, and that the Chief Justice’s commanding interpretation upheld “most of the law”).
257. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96.
258. Id. at 2596.
259. See id. (describing a penalty as a punishment and a tax as a means of influencing
decisions, but not actually mandating one way or the other by imposing punitive sanctions).
260. Id. at 2597.
261. See id. at 2593–94.
262. See, e.g., The Tax Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Democrats’ Health
Care Law: Hearing Before the H. Ways and Means Comm. 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (testimony of
Steven G. Bradbury).
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was lost on the defeat of the Court’s Commerce Clause holding.263 Such
commentators point to the Court’s decision as reading the mandate language out of
the statute.264 Their argument basically states that instead of declaring that
individuals “shall” maintain health insurance coverage, the Act is now rewritten
that individuals “should try to” maintain health insurance coverage.265 These
commentators claim that what is left of the Individual Mandate is solely a tax
assessment—if you go without health insurance, the Government will tax you
more.266 In fact, this was the Government’s reading of the statute under the taxing
power clause as not an order, but a tax on those who do not purchase the product, in
this case health insurance.267 The result is a tax on inaction by an individual.268
The importance of this classification is discussed later in Part V.
One may think that the Government, or specifically the IRS, as the designated
enforcer of the Individual Mandate provisions, may take some issue with those that
believe the Individual Mandate has been gutted. The requirement that an individual
“shall” ensure that he or she and their dependents have minimum essential coverage
is contained in the Code.269 The term “shall” in a traditional legal definition is
mandatory in nature and means an obligation or direction to do something.270 The
IRS generally views the term “shall” when used in the Code as also meaning
“must.”271 However, a closer review reveals that, in certain circumstances,
particularly with respect to individuals, the use of the term “shall” in a statute, such
as the Code, can be interpreted to mean “may.”272 Courts have noted that in cases
where the true intent of a statutory provision is required to be interpreted, the use of
the term “shall” can be viewed as permissive in the sense of “may.”273 This would
provide some additional support for the argument of a weakened Individual
Mandate if the Court has really set the bar with a “may” or “should” standard to
individuals to obtain health insurance. The IRS and HHS may also have to now
263. See id. at 3–4.
264. See, e.g., id. at 4 (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the statute renders the
Individual Mandate without any “substantive meaning separate from the tax penalty”).
265. Id. at 7.
266. See, e.g., id.
267. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012).
268. See id. at 2590.
269. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012).
270. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “shall” as “hav[ing] a duty
to” in a “mandatory sense”).
271. See Gertrude Block, Language for Lawyers, FED. LAW. 62, 62 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.fedbar.org/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2011/October/Departments/Language-forLawyers.aspx.
272. Id.
273. See Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 170 (1877) (“As against the Government,
the word ‘shall,’ when used in statutes, is to be construed as ‘may,’ unless a contrary intention is
manifest.”); see also Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 254 (N.D. 1960) (noting that
when the word “shall” is “used in constitutions and statutes,” it is read as mandatory, “but where it
is necessary to give effect to the intent the word will be construed as ‘may’”).
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interpret the Individual Mandate requirement as merely a policy of encouragement
of behavior and a trigger of only a different tax rate for individuals depending on
how they behave. Broad authority was given to such agencies for issuing
regulatory guidance under the Act274 and this interpretation may impact the type of
guidance.
More precisely, perhaps the result is that it is not unlawful now to not buy
health insurance, but instead is just a “suggestion” for individuals that they can
lawfully choose to ignore. It is only unlawful for an individual to not buy health
insurance and not pay the resulting tax increase.275 As a consequence, there is
justification to the claim that the Individual Mandate as a requirement no longer
exists since the Individual Mandate is now limited by its classification as a “tax” by
the Court. It does not require individuals to purchase anything, only suggests what
individuals should do if they don’t want to pay a higher tax. It may be a fine line,
however, to say that the Individual Mandate has no component that compels. One
could argue that the weakened Individual Mandate may actually now “compel”
more individuals into greater inaction with respect to health insurance after making
a reasonable financial decision and choice on the matter to not obtain coverage.
Although the Individual Mandate is predicted to motivate the largest portion of the
population to purchase healthcare, approximately thirty million individuals will
likely remain uninsured regardless of the changes to the Act (such as the Medicaid
Expansion and the Employer Mandate).276 A portion of these individuals will
certainly choose to remain uninsured voluntarily.
B.

Implementation: Where the Act Stands
Two Years After the Court’s Decision

Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision, many parts of the Act still
remain uncertain. Many employers and individuals waited to see the outcome of
the Supreme Court’s decision before taking action in anticipation of the Act.277
Many of those same employers and individuals then waited for the outcome of the
274. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148), CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that
Congress has given regulatory agencies much discretion because the heads of those agencies have
the broad authority to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary”).
275. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012) (noting that the
Individual Mandate does not attach negative legal consequences for not purchasing health
insurance beyond the required payment to the IRS, which is not a “punitive sanction”).
276. See UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 3 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter UPDATED
ESTIMATES
FOR
THE
INSURANCE
COVERAGE],
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Estimates.pdf
(estimating around 26 to 27 million nonelderly residents will remain uninsured after 2016).
277. See, e.g., NFIB v. Kathleen Sebelius and its Impact on Employers: Healthcare Reform
Revisited, NEW ENGLAND COUNCIL (2012), available at http://newenglandcouncil.com/assets/
HC-Update-Impact-of-ACA-ruling-on-Employers-07-05-12.pdf.
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2012 elections.278 Some have continued to wait for guidance as to how to proceed,
but because the Act is such a massive undertaking the federal government has been
slow to develop regulations needed for implementation.279 This has caused greater
uncertainty, leaving employers unprepared and in part necessitating the delay in the
Employer Mandate.280 While some states prepare to implement the Medicaid
Expansion voluntarily, others have chosen different routes, and the impact on the
healthcare market is notable.281 As the IRS prepares to implement the first scaled
tax penalty for the 2014 tax year, recent studies estimate that more and more people
will likely remain without health insurance after the Act’s full implementation.282
Although numbers are in flux, the loss of almost half of the Act’s originally
anticipated patient population has caused volatility in the healthcare market and has
in some cases paradoxically caused insurance prices to increase dramatically.283
Additionally, economists estimate that the classification of the Individual Mandate
as a tax, in combination with the rate increases due partially to the voluntary nature
of the Medicaid Expansion and the resultant decrease in the insurance population,
is unlikely to result in increased insurance enrollment.284

278. See Cancelosi, supra note 4, at 569–70 (discussing the uncertainty faced by employers
during the 2012 elections).
279. See, e.g., Mike Dorning & Alex Wayne, Health-Law Employer Mandate Delayed by U.S.
Until 2015, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2013, 7:51 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0702/health-law-employer-mandate-said-to-be-delayed-to-2015.html (discussing the Obama
administration’s decision to delay implementation of the Employer Mandate until reporting
requirements and regulations are finalized).
280. See id. (quoting Randy Johnson, Senior Vice President at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (“[E]mployers need more time and clarification of the rules of the road before
implementing the employer mandate.”).
281. See KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES 14 ( 2014), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2014/Jan/Implementing-theAffordable-Care-Act.aspx (finding, in a state-by-state analysis, that more than half the states will
expand their Medicaid programs, and about eighteen states will not pass new laws or regulations
on insurance market reforms under the ACA).
282. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3 (citing estimates
that predict more people will be uninsured as an effect of the ACA).
283. See, e.g., Avik Roy, How Obamacare Dramatically Increases The Cost of Insurance for
Young Workers, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:32 PM) (highlighting that in three states, premiums
will actually increase for individuals as a result of the ACA).
284. See Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion – The Soft
Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, NEW ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085 (2010) (noting that Medicaid
expansion and increased eligibility for health insurance “does not always translate into actual
enrollment”); see also CONNOR RYAN & CHRIS HOLT, TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY: UNINSURED
YOUNG ADULTS AND THE PERVERSE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://americanactionforum.org/uploads/
files/research/To_Buy_or_Not_to_Buy_-_FINAL.pdf (arguing that young people are “financially
incentivized to forego health insurance”).
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Possible Negative Impact on Goals and Objectives
of the Act’s Individual Mandate

The Individual Mandate’s goal of adding more people into the insurance
market, when accomplished, positively impacts the premium levels and stability of
the non-group and small group insurance markets.285 Millions more people added
to the insurance markets could bring market changes benefiting the consumer.286 If
these people for some reason choose not to join the market by not complying with
the Individual Mandate, there will be a direct consequence to the markets and a
corresponding loss of potential beneficial changes. This is a threat particularly
notable in regard to young individuals who may be more willing to dismiss the
Individual Mandate requirement or any moral persuasion because of the Court’s
interpretation and other factors.287 It is not an easy task to predict how many of that
group of uninsured will ultimately obtain health insurance, pay the penalty, or do
nothing.
A variety of factors will impact who of this group of uninsured would choose
to pay the penalty rather than obtain health insurance. These include (1) moral
factors, (2) the lack of a legal command, (3) public response, (4) how the penalty is
labeled, and (5) employer response.
1. Moral Factors
A variable that is present in any analysis of the goals and objectives of the
Individual Mandate is the impact of any moral persuasion the Individual Mandate
has on individuals to have health insurance in order to satisfy the Individual
Mandate and not pay a penalty.288 In the tax compliance world, the model of moral
persuasion assumes compliance is gained when the governmental or taxing agency
appeals to the individual taxpayer’s morale because the individual has a moral and
social obligation to comply.289 It is likely that Congress had used the penalty
provision in the Individual Mandate and even the word “penalty” to try and better
285. See LINDA BLUMBERG ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN PERSPECTIVE, URBAN
INSTITUTE 2 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412533-the-individualmandate.pdf.
286. See id.
287. See Grant Bosse, Obamacare’s Problems are More Than Just the Website, CONCORD
MONITOR (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/9049657-95/grant-bosseobamacares-problems-are-more-than-just-a-website (noting that healthy young people did not
purchase health insurance to the same degree as the general population prior to Obamacare, and
may find it financially advantageous to pay the penalty rather than buy health insurance).
288. See Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Why It’s Called the Affordable Care Act, 110
MICH.
L.
REV.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
1,
2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/bagleyhorwitz.pdf
(arguing
that
the
implementation of the Act reflects a national moral choice to provide more affordable and
available health insurance).
289. See Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax
Compliance: Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28 (2012).
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achieve the objectives of the Act by causing uninsured individuals to procure health
insurance.290 A morally persuasive underpinning was present in the Individual
Mandate provision from its beginning. Assuming that the Supreme Court’s “tax”
classification and decision has weakened the Individual Mandate to a mere
suggestion for individuals,291 the impact of any moral persuasion may now be less
significant and less likely to cause insurance purchases. It was not the goal of
Congress to have a large group of individuals, after full implementation of the Act,
continue to go without health insurance and pay more in taxes,292 yet that may now
be an indirect consequence of the Court’s decision.
2. Lack of Legal Command
Some observers now conclude that because of the lack of a “legal command”
to buy health insurance, as previously discussed, there is a concern that the
Individual Mandate will not fulfill the function that it was intended to do.293
Without a direct legal mandate to buy health insurance or a perceived risk of being
in violation of federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and conveyed to the
public, the question is now whether this interpretation will cause more of an
increase in the number of individuals electing to pay the tax instead of buying
health insurance than was originally projected. The argument is premised on the
theory that if it was a true legal mandate, individuals would perhaps tend to morally
have a greater desire to comply with the Individual Mandate and purchase the
required health insurance.294 Individuals previously projected to obtain health
insurance because of the Individual Mandate’s “requirement” and penalty features
may not be so morally compelled with the Supreme Court’s softer version of the
Individual Mandate and its “tax” classification. Both before and after the Court’s
decision, the dollar cost for individuals of the tax penalty would be less than the
dollar cost of actually purchasing individual health insurance.295 For many

290. See Edward White, Supreme Court Exceeded Authority Rewriting the ACA, JURIST (July
21, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/07/edward-white-aca-rewrite.php (asserting
that Congress intentionally used the word penalty because it was not trying to raise revenue
through the mandate as a tax, but was rather trying to push individuals towards purchasing health
care).
291. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that labeling the mandate as a “tax” instead of a “penalty” trivializes the Act).
292. See Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, supra note 38 (listing the ACA’s three main goals as
decreasing cost of health care, improving quality of health care, and making health care more
accessible).
293. See The Tax Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Democrats’ Health Care
Law: Hearing Before the H. Ways and Means Comm. 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (testimony of Steven
G. Bradbury).
294. See id. at 9.
295. See supra text accompanying note 77 (noting that the total penalty cannot exceed the
average national cost of a bronze plan offered through the exchange).
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individuals cost may be a more (or perhaps the most) important factor now as they
weigh the moral factor, if at all, on whether to obtain health insurance.
3. Public Response
The CBO, after the Supreme Court’s decision was released, issued an update
on their estimates regarding the impact of the Act’s insurance provisions.296
Interestingly, the CBO did not substantially change their estimate of the impact of
the Individual Mandate and penalty provision on individuals and their likelihood to
acquire health insurance or pay the penalty.297 The percentages remained relatively
the same.298 The CBO’s analysis was based on a comparison with other types of
taxes and penalties and general compliance by the public with those other
provisions.299 Based on that information, the CBO did believe and still apparently
believes that even after the Court’s decision that individual behavior would be the
same and that people would perceive the Individual Mandate as a “requirement” to
purchase health insurance.300 It is apparently an embedded behavioral response of
people of either fulfilling their “civic” duty or having a fear of an IRS penalty that
creates this behavior. However, it is not elaborated upon any further by the
CBO.301 It is unclear whether either the “civic duty” motivation or the penalty
motivation is likely to produce the CBO’s expected results. Interestingly, the most
recent estimates from the CBO show a changing behavioral response of less people
tilting to paying the penalty: estimated revenue from penalty collections from
2016−2022 has decreased from $55 billion in 2012302 to $32 billion in 2014.303
At the time the Individual Mandate was moving through the legislative phase,
there were a wide variety of opinions on how the public would react to the

296. ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 14.
297. See id. at 3, 14.
298. See id. at 14 (noting that after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
ACA’s Individual Mandate, the CBO and JCT did not change their estimates on the mandate’s
effect on coverage); see also id. at 18 tbl.1, 19 tbl.2, 20 tbl.3 (estimating the impact of the
Supreme Court’s decision on insurance coverage).
299. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 14 (noting CBO
and JCT’s earlier approximations of the mandate’s impact on people’s decisions to obtain
insurance were based on tax compliance literature and assessment of the strength of incentives,
financial considerations, and nonmonetary considerations); Auerbach et. al., supra note 83, at 10–
13, 16–20, 24–25 (assessing the impact of the Individual Mandate on coverage by examining other
federal and state mandates and tax compliance generally).
300. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3.
301. See id. at 3.
302. See PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT, supra note 84, at 1.
303. See INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note
149.
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Individual Mandate, ranging from the Individual Mandate strongly encouraging
more people to buy health insurance to actually causing people to forgo buying
insurance in favor of paying the penalty because the cost of the penalty was less
than the insurance cost.304 Many studies of mandates on citizens look to three
disciplines in estimating the impact a mandate has on individual decisions, the first
being health economics and the other two being tax compliance and behavioral
economics.305 The CBO had concluded, based on this type of analysis, that the
Individual Mandate would indeed increase insurance coverage among the
population.306 The CBO reasoned that although paying the penalty may, in direct
dollars, cost less that the insurance premium, people who do buy insurance receive
a benefit or return on their investment in the form of health insurance which the
penalty does not provide.307 In the process of weighing which choice provides a
better outcome or value for individuals, the CBO factored in economics and
determined that people tend to respond more affirmatively than negatively because
of the lower cost of compliance combined with benefit.308 In addition, the decision
will likely be influenced by several intangible factors reviewed by the CBO, such
as social norms and moral behavior.309
4. The Label Analysis
After the Court’s decision, the Individual Mandate still seems to remain
unpopular among certain groups regardless of whether the shared responsibility
payment is labeled a “penalty” or “tax.” One of the more interesting surveys that
came out after the Court’s decision was a poll done by the Kaiser Family
Foundation on the number of people expected to pay the shared responsibility
payment penalty when it is defined as a “tax” as opposed to a “fine.”310 When
asked if they expected to have to pay a “fine” when the Individual Mandate takes
effect, 12% expected to pay the fine while the rest would presumably comply with
the Individual Mandate through current or new insurance coverage.311 When a
different group of individuals were instead asked if they expected to have to pay a
“tax” when the Individual Mandate takes effect, 26% expected to pay the tax with

304. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 1–2.
305. See id. at 2 (stating that in the absence of empirical evidence, research from health
economics, tax compliance, and behavioral economics may provide perspective on the
consequence of the Individual Mandate).
306. Id. at 25.
307. Id. at 13.
308. See id. at 25.
309. See id.
310. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: PUBLIC OPINION ON
HEALTH CARE ISSUES 6 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/8339-f.pdf.
311. Id.
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the remainder presumably having or planning on acquiring health insurance.312
Classifying the shared responsibility payment as a “tax” rather than a “fine”
apparently caused more than twice as many people to respond that they would pay
it and forgo obtaining health insurance coverage.313
What may be missing from the label analysis, however, is the moral factor
regarding whether individuals may be motivated by doing what is right.314 If the
message is conveyed to individuals in a manner that encourages moral action, it
could tip the scale back to compliance with the Individual Mandate. The optics,
however, could easily suggest that as a result of the Court’s classification of the
penalty as a “tax” and the way the Individual Mandate is conveyed to the public in
the next few years, there could be an even greater number of people putting a lower
emphasis on the Individual Mandate’s implicit requirement and not acquiring
health insurance. Some in that group would opt to pay the tax penalty, but others
could ignore both the Individual Mandate requirement and the tax penalty to create
an even worse scenario: individuals that will not comply or pay the penalty for
failure.
5. Employer Response
Another interesting variable is how many employers will respond to the Act’s
insurance coverage provisions—specifically, what weight will employers give to
the moral desire of employees to have health insurance to satisfy the Individual
Mandate? Studies suggest that as employers place decreased weight on an
employee’s desire for health insurance under the Individual Mandate, the number
of people whose employers are projected to stop offering health insurance coverage
in response to the Act increases.315 By increasing the weight that employers place
on an employee’s desire for health insurance, it “decreases the number of people
whose employers are projected to stop offering coverage” in response to the Act.316
The CBO had earlier projected that the Individual Mandate with its penalty
provision would lead to more employees seeking health insurance coverage.317 As
a result, there would be a greater demand for health insurance and an increased
incentive for employers to offer health insurance to attract and retain employees.318

312. Id.
313. See id.
314. See, e.g., Janet Dolgin & Katherine Dietrich, Social And Legal Debate About The
Affordable Care Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 45, 58–59 (2011) (suggesting that, “a far-reaching
competition for ideological victory lies at the center of the health care reform effort and the
counter-effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act”).
315. See CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 44,
at 17.
316. Id. at 17–18.
317. See id. at 7.
318. See id. at 7.
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The taxing power decision of the Court and the optics of a “tax” as opposed to a
penalty fine may distort that outcome. Will employers now view the Individual
Mandate as carrying less of a “stick” in regard to its potential consequences for
individuals? If so, will that minimize the weight those employers would otherwise
place on the moral desire of their employees and potential employees to have health
insurance? As a result, a consequence of the Court’s decision may be that less
employers offer health insurance coverage, and thus that their employees must
either go into market themselves or pay the tax.
D.

Could Further Legislation be Possible Under the Taxing Power if the
Goal of Having More Insureds Under the Act is Not Met?

The economic reality of the Court’s decision may be the opposite of what
Congress intended if more individuals forgo buying health insurance than
previously projected and a void is created. The shift of labels from a penalty to a
“tax” by the Court’s decision could be a determinative factor in any increase in the
number of people in each of several subgroups. Those subgroups include (i)
individuals opting to pay the penalty because the tax owed will be less than the cost
of health insurance coverage, (ii) individuals adopting a public view that the only
consequence of not buying insurance is a little more tax owed, or (iii) individuals
minimizing any moral obligation to buy health insurance.
Some have predicted that Congress or the Administration could, in the future,
try to increase the dollar amount of the shared responsibility payment penalty to
push individuals back from the non-compliant end of the spectrum and on to the
health insurance purchaser side.319 It is not known how high the amount of the tax
penalty could go before crossing the line into a true penalty and punitive territory.
The argument made by those concerned is that individuals could be “coerced” into
the health insurance market due to higher tax cost consequences in the future.320
The fact that this is considered to be an available tool is interesting, although there
is room for debate as to whether such legislation could pass Congress. Research
does suggest that the size of the penalty is one factor that will increase the number
of individuals that comply with the Individual Mandate and obtain coverage.321

319. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, How the Supreme Court Doomed the ACA to Failure, 35
REG. 32, 35 (2013) (suggesting that proponents of the Act in Congress likely planned on raising
the Individual Mandate penalty once the law went into effect in order to increase compliance).
320. See Jeffrey H. Anderson, Taking Aim at Obamacare’s Coercive Core, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/taking-aim-obamacare-scoercive-core_757288.html (arguing that an estimated 40% of the ACA enrollment may be
attributable to coercion from the Individual Mandate).
321. See David Auerbach et. al., supra note 83, at 2–3 (explaining that research suggests that
the success of mandates may be contingent on the size of the penalty relative to the cost of
compliance); see also Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy Of Mandates
For Health Insurance, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1612, 1618 (2007) (noting that the effectiveness of
obedience to mandates increases relative to the fine, but only up to a certain point).
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Nevertheless, the Court was firm in its position that the extension of the penalizing
features of a tax can cause it to become a mere penalty and that the “power to tax is
not the power to destroy.”322 The Court, however, did not believe that it was the
appropriate time to further decide at what point the Individual Mandate tax crossed
the line into a punitive penalty.323 It is hard to see that there is much room for any
movement of the Individual Mandate penalty cost that would not run afoul of the
Constitutional limitations raised by the Court.
The Court did not believe that the shared responsibility payment crossed the
line to become an actual penalty and solely a tool to punish for several reasons.324
The “tax” characteristics of the shared responsibility payment penalty remain
within the parameters of the Court’s practical definition of a tax.325 The process of
the payment of the shared responsibility payment penalty via payment with one’s
tax return, the calculation of the payment based on taxable income, dependents and
filing status, and enforcement by the IRS demonstrated for the Court a payment
that looks and acts like a “tax.”326 Labels of exactions are not fatal according to the
Court, at least with respect to the exercise of Congress’s taxing power, and the
Court was adamant that labels not control in this case.327 While Congress could
attempt to motivate a shift from the uninsured pool to the insured pool by further
increasing the amount of the penalty or increasing the IRS’s enforcement tools,
such actions would clearly be problematic under the Court’s taxing power holding.
The CBO predicted that the IRS’s ability to require tax reporting from
individuals and insurance companies in order to match up data of those with
insurance coverage would result in a higher rate of compliance with the Individual
Mandate than without such an enforcement tool.328 The use of such matching
programs by the IRS in other tax areas tends to result in greater compliance.329 The
IRS, by utilizing additional information reporting and matching programs to
determine compliance along with the penalty, could increase the incentive for
people to comply with an Individual Mandate. The broad regulatory authority

322. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
323. See id. (arguing that because the mandate is currently within the narrow limits of a tax, it
is currently not necessary for the Court to decide at what point the mandate would be prohibited
under the taxing power).
324. See id. at 2599–600.
325. See id. at 2600.
326. See id. at 2594.
327. See id. at 2597–98.
328. See Auerbach et al., supra note 83, at 18 (finding that the IRS’s enforcement of the ACA’s
Individual Mandate would “yield higher rates of compliance” using information-reporting and
data matching programs as compared to penalties alone).
329. See id. at 18 (noting higher tax compliance rates when the IRS uses third-party data
matching systems).
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given under the Act to the IRS330 may be an avenue for such action. Following the
Court’s decision, there has been some concern that Congress could avail itself of
additional tax enforcement mechanisms, including criminal prosecution, tax audits,
liens, etc., to create greater compliance with the Individual Mandate.331 Studies
suggest that increasing the likelihood that a penalty will be levied and collected via
enforcement increases the incentive for individuals to comply with the law.332 The
IRS’s general enforcement reputation is another factor that could increase
compliance with the Individual Mandate.
The Court cautioned that the taxing power does not allow Congress the same
degree of control over the particular individual subject to it.333 An individual who
disobeys a regulation that is constitutional under the Commerce Clause may be
subject to a full range of consequences, including criminal sanctions and loss of
certain rights.334 Under the taxing power, an individual is required to pay money to
the IRS as a consequence of not taking the designated action and, if the “tax” is
properly paid, the Government cannot punish the individual any further.335 It is
noteworthy that the Court also stated that “individuals do not have a lawful choice
not to pay a tax due” and can in some cases “face prosecution for failing to do
so.”336 However, this is not true in the case of the shared responsibility payment
penalty where criminal prosecution is not currently allowed under the Act for
failure to pay.337 If further legislation was proposed to add tax enforcement
mechanisms, including criminal prosecution, to create greater compliance with the
Individual Mandate and to increase the number of insureds, this would likely
invalidate the Individual Mandate under the taxing power.

330. See id. (noting that under the ACA, the IRS could combine penalties with matching
programs to increase compliance); The IRS and its 46 New Powers to Enforce ObamaCare,
GALEN INST. (June 5, 2013), http://www.galen.org/2013/46-new-irs-powers-to-enforceobamacare (noting the unprecedented power granted to the IRS through forty six new powers
under the ACA). But see Jordan M. Barry & Bryan T. Camp, Is the Individual Mandate Really
Mandatory?, 135 TAX NOTES 1633, 1638 (2012) (noting that while the ACA authorizes the IRS to
administer and collect the Individual Mandate broadly “in the same manner as an assessable
penalty,” the ACA significantly limits the tools the IRS can use to collect the Individual Mandate
as compared to other taxes).
331. IRS May Be Unable To Enforce The ACA's Individual Mandate, ADVISORY BD. CO. (May
15, 2014), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/10/31/irs-may-be-unable-to-enforce-theaca-individual-mandate; John DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court's
Ruling and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 Cal. Ins. L. & Reg. Rep. 1 (2012).
332. See Auerbach et al., supra note 85, at 18.
333. Nat’l. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
334. See id. (noting that under the Commerce Clause, Congress can subject an individual to
various sanctions, including criminal prosecution and deprivation of civil rights).
335. See id.
336. Id. at 2600 n.11.
337. See id. at 2597 (finding that neither the Act nor any other law creates an allowance for
criminal prosecution for not buying health insurance).
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Impact of Waivers Granted to Individuals in States that
Refuse to Participate in the Expansion of Medicaid

As discussed, the number of newly insured predicted under the Act has
become a slippery number as a result of the Court’s decision.338 For example,
many of these individuals will have income that falls below the filing thresholds.339
Others will be exempt because they would have to pay more than 8% of their
income for health insurance.340 Finally, some of these individuals are likely to
receive a hardship exemption from HHS.341
The issuance of the hardship exemptions by HHS raises an interesting
question as to whether a larger involvement of HHS with the Individual Mandate
impacts the “tax” classification of the penalty that was addressed by the Court. In
order for the Court to reach its taxing power position it looked to the agency that
essentially was involved in the administration of the penalty (tax).342 In this case
the IRS was the sole agency viewed by the Court.343 If HHS takes on a bigger and
more influential role with the Individual Mandate in deciding who is exempt and
who is not exempt, it could result in the Individual Mandate provision becoming
more regulatory or punitive and convert the tax back into a penalty classification.
F.

Reaction to the Taxing Power Argument

The Court’s conclusion in National Federation was poorly received by many,
especially Republicans and legal conservatives.344
There was substantial
expectation that the Court would strike down the case in its entirety, and its failure
to do so was regarded by some as a failure to properly comport itself in the
“political” process.345 The Chief Justice especially has received a great deal of
338. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.3. (discussing how many employers and individuals waited for
the Court’s decision before taking any action, and the CBO’s analyses in predicting how the
Court’s decision would impact an individual’s likelihood to acquire health insurance or pay the
penalty, respectively).
339. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 4, 16.
340. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2012) (exempting individuals whose coverage for
the month exceeds 8% of their household income for the taxable year).
341. See id. § 5000A(e)(5).
342. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (discussing how the IRS will collect the
payment through its means of taxation).
343. See id. (discussing how the IRS is the sole agency that collects the payment).
344. See Bill Mears & Tom Cohen, Emotions High After Supreme Court Upholds Health Care
Law, CNN (June 28, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-ruling/
(reporting that many Republicans criticized the Court’s holding and vowed to repeal the Act).
345. See John S. Hoff, Obamacare: Chief Justice Robert’s Political Doge, 18 INDEP. REV. 5, 5
(2013) (arguing that the Court’s decision was one of several “rule-bending steps” taken to protect
the ACA, and that the Court has stretched its boundaries and failed to adhere to the political
process). See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Robert’s Individual Mandate: The Lawless
Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 15, 15 (2013) (discussing how many in the
legal world were shocked by the outcome of National Federation).
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negative attention for his role in deciding the case.346 As a Justice who is popularly
identified as a judicial conservative appointed by a conservative Republican
president, there was a public expectation (if not hope within conservative circles)
that he would be more inclined to strike down the case than uphold it.347 The issue
of universal healthcare itself had become particularly relevant and controversial
given it was an election year, and many Republicans opposed the Act as a matter of
policy and political doctrine.348
Because of this controversy, it is surprising that the decision as a whole seems
to be an exercise in legal moderation—that is, adherence to judicial restraint and
avoidance. This is in keeping with the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy, and
might have been more foreseeable from him than a strong political stance.349
Nonetheless, many conservatives hold him personally accountable for failing to
uphold a Constitutional interpretation more similar to their own.350 Further, there is
substantial dissatisfaction with the Court as a whole for a decision that many feel
neglects their proper role as the ultimate decision-making body.351 However, the
opinion clearly states the Court’s opinion that, should legislation be Constitutional,
the Court ought not properly interfere.352 The Chief Justice, for the majority, stated

346. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 345, at 15 (discussing how Justice Robert’s leadership role
in National Federation left Republicans “fuming”).
347. See id. (discussing how despite popular belief, Chief Justice John Roberts surprised
conservatives and liberals by upholding the constitutionality of the ACA); see also Hoff, supra
note 345, at 5 (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts “surprised practically everyone” by being the
swing vote to uphold the constitutionality of the ACA).
348. See generally Ezra Klein, Do Republicans Really Want Universal Health Care,
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/do-republicansreally-want-universal-health-care-.html (discussing that in post-ACA elections, voters would have
to choose between one party that supported universal health care and one that did not).
349. See John Dean, Why Chief Justice Roberts Dared Not Overturn President Obama’s
Healthcare Plan, JUSTIA (June 29, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/29/why-chief-justiceroberts-dared-not-overturn-president-obamas-healthcare-plan (arguing that although many were
surprised with Chief Justice’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, they should not
have been because his decision was consistent with his philosophy); Stephen M. Feldman, Chief
Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO.
L. REV. 335, 348 (2013) (noting that in National Federation, Roberts “articulated conservative
constitutional doctrine”, and urged the Court to decide the case without considering politics).
350. See Benjamin Hart, John Roberts Criticism: Conservatives Continue to Attack Justice
After
Health
Care
Ruling,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
29,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/29/john-roberts-criticism-continues_n_1637410.html
(discussing the conservative backlash and criticisms of Chief Justice Roberts in the wake of his
“surprise majority opinion”); The Roberts Rule: The Chief Justice Rewrites ObamaCare in Order
to Save It, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304058404577494400059173634 (blaming Chief Justice Roberts for his
“infinitely elastic” and “dangerous interpretation” of the taxing power).
351. See, e.g., Magarian, supra 345, at 16 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s legal analyses
neglects the proper role of the Court and exemplifies a sense of lawlessness).
352. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
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that the Court was not meant to stand as a bulwark between the people and the
fruits of their political decisions, good or bad.353
V. WILL THE COURT’S DECISION OPEN UP THE GATES FOR THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT TO INFLUENCE OTHER ACTIONS/INACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
HEALTHCARE UNDER CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER?
A.

Is There a New Expansion of the Taxing Power?

One question raised since the Court’s decision came out is whether there has
been an expansion of Congress’s taxing power.354 With its taxing power argument,
the Government urged the Court that the Act’s Individual Mandate should be read
in a different manner.355 Instead of an order to do something (i.e., buy health
insurance), the Individual Mandate should be interpreted as one that solely imposes
a tax on individuals who do not buy health insurance or who “do nothing.”356 A
significant concern for the Court was the issue of whether Congress is permitted to
impose a tax on individuals who abstain or do nothing.357 It was clear that the
Court in its Commerce Clause analysis and holding found it unconstitutional for
Congress to regulate those who do not buy health insurance via a command to buy
such health insurance.358 Unlike Congress’s power to regulate commerce,
however, Congress’s taxing power is broad and the question for the Court was not
whether Congress can tax but whether Congress exercised its taxing power
properly.359 In a threefold response, the Court found that the Constitution directly
or indirectly does not permit individuals to avoid taxes through inactivity and
therefore the use of the taxing power was proper.360
The decision may not herald an expansion of the taxing power, but it certainly
confirmed the use of it in situations of inaction by individuals. The Court noted
that Congress’s use of its taxing power to encourage buying something is not
something new.361 Influencing or promoting conduct with tax incentives is not
uncommon—for example, buying a house with the mortgage interest deduction

353. See id.
354. See Barry Cushman, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Transformation of the Taxing Power, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 197 (2013) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion leaves
unclear the future of taxing power jurisprudence and the uncertainty of Congress’s ability to use
its taxing power).
355. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593−94.
356. See id.
357. See Comments, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 72, 76–77 (2012).
358. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
359. See id. at 2599.
360. Id. at 2599–600.
361. See id. at 2599.
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incentive.362 To the Court, influencing the purchase of health insurance was no
different.363 Raising revenue may be the main reason for taxes, but also influencing
individual conduct may be another purpose (e.g., cigarette taxes to deter
smoking).364 The Court specifically noted that the Act’s ability to influence
whether to buy health insurance does not invalidate it under the taxing power.365
Further, due to the Court’s makeup and analysis of the historical uses of the taxing
power by Congress, it has been proposed that, “history and pragmatism suggest that
this case will have a marginal jurisprudential impact.”366 As such, using the taxing
power to influence behavior does not appear to be an expansion of the taxing power
by the Court.367
B.

Other Areas to Improve the Nation’s Health—A Tax
on Individuals for Not Eating Their Broccoli?

In its simplistic form, if an individual does not maintain health insurance
under the Individual Mandate, the basic consequence is that he or she needs to
make an additional payment to the IRS at tax time or, alternatively if the individual
is due a refund from the IRS, have his or her income tax refund amount decreased
by the IRS. 368 The Government argued that the inaction of individuals not
obtaining health insurance is a “condition” triggering a tax payment to the IRS,
and, like many other “conditions,” can be subject to a tax.369 The Supreme Court
did not disagree.370 This raises the question as to what other areas could this
“payment in lieu of” argument for inaction be utilized to improve the nation’s
health? It should be put into perspective the claim by some that Congress is now
able to tax one for the failure to take action in whatever context.
There seems to be perhaps an understated view from the Court about when
something is an unlawful activity. The CBO had predicted that a significant
number of people will elect to pay a penalty to the IRS instead of paying for health
insurance, a number which, as earlier discussed, could now be even higher as a
362. See id. (discussing how Congress has used tax incentives to promote purchasing homes
and professional educations).
363. See id.
364. See id. at 2596.
365. See id.
366. Robert Pushaw & Grant Nelson, The Likely Impact Of National Federation On Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 979–980 (2013).
367. See Mystica M. Alexander & Timothy Gagnon, The Roberts Court: Using The Taxing
Power To Shape Individual Behavior, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346 (2012) (arguing that
the Court’s holding in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius was “not an indefensible stretch” of
the taxing power as the Act was “simply another use by Congress of the taxing power as a stick to
regulate individual behavior”).
368. See id. at 361−363, 368 (discussing the requirements of the Individual Mandate as
interpreted by the Supreme Court).
369. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593−94.
370. See id. at 2593−2594.
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result of the Court’s decision.371 The Court believed that if such a large number of
people failing to buy health insurance was acceptable to the Government, their
inaction could hardly be considered unlawful, but instead is a payment in lieu of
action.372 The Court noted that the Act does not declare that failing to buy health
insurance is unlawful.373 If an individual has instead paid the appropriate amount
to the IRS, he or she has fully complied with the law.374 For the Court, penalties
equate to punishment for something unlawful and this inaction of not buying health
insurance and the resulting tax is not a penalty.375
Is there a legitimate choice between action and inaction in other health areas?
The Court was clear that the Individual Mandate in effect is just a tax hike on
certain taxpayers who do not have health insurance.376 Does it make going without
an annual health examination just another thing the Government can tax? Where
does Congress’s constitutional power to tax end? The majority opinion addresses
the usage of taxation to influence behavior and its long-standing historical
precedent.377 So long as a tax is not unnecessarily punitive, or is such that there is
no feasibly desirable option other than to pay, then taxes as incentives or as
regulation are acceptable.378 Taxes have long been used to influence behavior such
as smoking and drinking, or purchasing property.379 The tax on not acquiring
health insurance is not substantially different.
The Court’s decision in this case was so dependent on the limited nature of
the statute, and the limited nature of the taxing power, that it is unlikely that future
expansion in other areas of health care will follow. The Chief Justice heavily
advocated a case-by-case analysis in his opinions, and here the specific facts were
key in his decision. Had the penalty (tax) been too large or been enforceable in any
other context (e.g., criminal or civil liability), then it would likely not have
succeeded. The Court clearly noted that punitive actions masquerading as taxes
would not be permissible.380 Further, the use of labels seems to be made
insignificant by this case, thus lessening any possibility of avoiding political
accountability. If the Court will construe what is labeled a penalty as both a tax
and not a tax (for Anti-Injunction purposes) based on what it perceives the true

371. See ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION, supra note 92, at 3 (estimating an
increase in the number of people uninsured predicted by the CBO in March 2012).
372. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597 (2012).
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See id. at 2596−98.
376. See id. at 2594.
377. See id. at 2598−600.
378. See id. at 2596.
379. Id.
380. See id. at 2596 (clarifying that while the IRS has the power to tax normally, the IRS
cannot use taxation as a “punitive sanction”).
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nature of the statute to be, then any effort to abuse the taxing power is unlikely to
be allowed solely on the basis of a label.
As Justice Scalia pointed out, Congress does have the authority to tax the
failure to purchase broccoli.381 But the dissent and the Chief Justice seem to agree
that allowing Congress to tax a failure to purchase, even if it solved a national
crisis, would impermissibly extend the bounds of Congressional authority.382
Further, broccoli on the whole is relatively inexpensive. Any permissible tax
would have to offer a real choice between owning broccoli and the alternative, as
the majority interpreted the Individual Mandate to do, and thus as a tax would be
negligible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of the Individual Mandate is to increase the number of
individuals in the United States having health insurance.383 When the Act was
challenged in the courts, the Administration and other supporters of the Act
believed that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to require or
compel individuals to purchase health insurance.384 Five members of the Supreme
Court disagreed with the Administration and found that Congress had no authority
under the Commerce Clause to impose the Individual Mandate.385 The Individual
Mandate was, nevertheless, upheld under Congress’s taxing power authority, which
was viewed by many in the public as a victory for health care reform.386 On closer
examination, however, the outcome of the decision can perhaps be better
characterized as creating an unintended obstacle to meeting the overall goals and
objectives of the Act.387 The lack of a true mandate requiring the purchase of

381. See id. at 2650 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
382. See id. at 2589 (2012); see also id. at 2650 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
383. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring all applicable individuals to maintain
minimum essential coverage each month, starting January 1, 2014). See Dinsmore & Shehi, LLP,
supra note 38 (discussing the ACA’s three fundamental goals of improving the quality of health
care and making health care more affordable and accessible).
384. See Experts Debate Congress’ Authority Over Health Insurance, NPR (June 9, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/09/137080510/does-congress-have-the-power-to-mandate-healthinsurance-enrollment (discussing how President Obama believed that Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the health care industry, and why Congress has the power
to regulate health care).
385. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593, 2608 (2012).
386. See id.; Richard Wolf & David Jackson, Supreme Court Upholds Obama Health Care
Mandate,
USA
TODAY
(June
28,
2012,
4:12
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-06-28/supreme-courthealth-care-ruling/55888742/1 (quoting Yale law professor Akhil Reed Amar, who argued that the
decision to uphold the Individual Mandate “save[d] the health care law”).
387. See Brietta Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 541, 549 (2013)
(questioning the long term impact of National Federation and whether its holding will further
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health insurance, because of the Court’s taxing power decision and the “tax”
classification of the penalty, may likely result in the Individual Mandate not
fulfilling the function it was intended to do.
In addition, the Court’s decision that makes the Medicaid Expansion optional
for states created another obstacle on top of the taxing power “tax” classification,
as many states will not expand their Medicaid eligibility programs.388 This has
resulted in projections of a larger number of low-income people without health
insurance based on the Court’s decision on the Medicaid Expansion.389 Other
individuals will not carry insurance because of exemptions, or because now they
believe a better choice is to pay the tax.390 Some may ignore both the Individual
Mandate and the tax penalty if not persuaded by any moral obligation. So while
the Court’s decision may be viewed as a political victory, the decision may actually
make it more difficult to achieve the Act’s objective of increasing the number of
insureds in America.
The Court’s decision is unlikely to create any expansion of Congress’ taxing
power or open up a new avenue for the Administration or Congress to influence
other activities with respect to health care under the taxing power.391 However,
there is still great uncertainty about the future of health care in America. There are
still over a dozen lawsuits challenging the provisions of the Act requiring
limit the federal government’s freedom to spend money in changing the health care market in the
future).
388. See A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID
EXPANSION, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision will leave it up to the
choice of each state as to whether or not to expand Medicaid); Jon Perr, Better Dead and Red:
How the GOP Blocked Health Care for Red State Americans, DAILY KOS (Sept. 29, 2013, 7:30
AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/09/29/1241710/-Better-Dead-and-Red-How-the-GOPblocked-health-care-for-red-state-Americans (explaining that many Republican-led states refuse to
expand Medicaid).
389. See THE COVERAGE GAP: UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN STATES THAT DO NOT EXPAND
MEDICAID, supra note 119 (finding that about five million poor uninsured adults in states that do
not expand Medicaid will likely remain uninsured).
390. See Tami Luhby, No Thanks, Obamacare. I’ll Pay the Penalty, CNN MONEY (Sept. 20,
2013,
9:55
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/20/news/economy/obamacare-penalty/
(showcasing the different perspectives of citizens who refuse to get health insurance, choosing to
pay the penalty instead); Rachael Bade & Brett Norman, Obamacare: Who will ignore law’s
requirements?,
POLITICO
(Oct.
13,
2013,
4:30
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/obamacare-mandate-some-americans-will-ignorerequirement-98236.html (describing how many feel that it is cheaper to pay the penalty, but that
what they do not realize is that the penalty will get more expensive each year); Joseph Antos &
Michael R. Strain, If You Don’t Buy Insurance, Will You Really Pay the Tax?, THE AMERICAN
(July 17, 2012), http://www.american.com/archive/2012/july/if-you-dont-buy-insurance-will-youreally-pay-the-tax (stating that many may be exempt from buying health insurance, such as low
income individuals exempt from filing taxes, illegal aliens, Native Americans, and prisoners).
391. See Sallie Sanford, Unexpected Twists in the Affordable Care Act Decision, JURIST (July
13, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/07/sallie-sanford-scotus-aca.php (questioning whether the
Court’s decision expands Congressional power, but acknowledging that typically taxes are used to
encourage behaviors, and that the Court’s decision may be a unique circumstance of the extension
of Congressional ability to tax those who do not receive health care).
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employers to pay for coverage of certain medical services.392 Additionally, the
President and Congress will be making significant decisions about reforming
entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and reducing the federal
deficit.393 It is possible that provisions of the Act will be amended as part of a
grand compromise between our elected branches.
Furthermore, decisions regarding the expansion of Medicaid coverage and the
creation of state insurance exchanges will be in the hands of various state officials,
and this has added to the uncertainty.394 Health care policy has historically been
negotiated and developed between traditional stakeholders: the carriers and the
providers.395 Change, while tedious and incremental, was possible.396 Today, as a
result of the requirements of the Act and the Court’s decision, political forces now
control the outcome of policy. These new political forces, such as state governors
and legislatures, often take radically opposed and extreme views on policy, thus
making compromise difficult.397 In Texas, for example, every traditional
participant in the development of health care policy is in favor of Medicaid

392. See Jodi Jacobson, Eighteen For-Profit Companies Fighting to Eliminate the Birth
Control
Benefit,
RH
REALITY
CHECK
(Mar.
7,
2013,
5:35
PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/03/07/the-18-for-profit-companies-fighting-to-eliminate-thebirth-control-benefit/ (reporting that eighteen companies have filed lawsuits to fight against the
ACA’s mandate that employers cover all forms of basic preventative care, which includes
reproductive and sexual-health-care services).
393. See Mary Agnes Carey, Five Ways The President’s Budget Would Change Medicare,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/april/15/
medicare-and-obama-budget.aspx (discussing President Obama’s 2014 budget proposal, which
includes reforms to Medicare and Medicaid); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PRESIDENT’S 2014 BUDGET 1–3 (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/44173-APB_0.pdf (analyzing the impact President Obama’s 2014 budget proposal
would have on the federal deficit).
394. See ADVISORY BD. CO., Where Each State Stands on ACA’s Medicaid Expansion (June
14, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap (stating that the
choice of expanding Medicaid coverage will be up to each state’s governor and state leaders); see
also Robert E. Moffit & Edmund F. Haislmaier, Obamacare’s Insurance Exchanges: “Private
Coverage” in Name Only, 2846 BACKGROUNDER 1, 3 (2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2013/09/obamacares-insurance-exchanges-private-coverage-in-name-only
(explaining
how state officials are expected to set up required insurance exchanges, but that only seventeen
states and the District of Columbia plan to facilitate their own exchanges); David K. Jones et al.,
Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma, 39 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 97, 131 (2014) (noting that future Republican electoral victories “could
create more uncertainty over the future of exchanges and the ACA).
395. Randall Ellis et al., Comparisons of Health Insurance Systems in Developed Countries
15, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony Culver ed., forthcoming 2014),
available at https://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/documents/EllisPaper.pdf.
396. See Paul G. Ginsburg, Competition in Health Care: Its Evolution Over The Past Decade,
24 HEALTH AFF. 1512, 1514 (2005) (recognizing that there had been change in health care policy,
particularly with hospital mergers, but that this trend proceeded slowly).
397. See Kyle Thomson, State-Run Insurance Exchanges in Federal Healthcare Reform: A
Case Study in Dysfunctional Federalism, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 548, 559−61 (2012).
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expansion, as well as many local governments and the business community.398
However, the political leadership of a conservative governor and a Republicancontrolled legislature have blocked any effort at Medicaid expansion.399 The
decision by the Court to allow states to opt out of Medicaid expansion has allowed
similar Republican-controlled state governors and legislatures in other states to
undermine one of the fundamental components of the Act.400
The way forward will depend in part upon government policy and political
outcomes both at the national and state level. House Republicans have voted
numerous times to repeal the Act.401 Now they have turned their sights to blocking
measures that fund the Act.402 This is a risky strategy with the potential for
troublesome consequences, as evidenced by the government shutdown in 2013.403
Another problem with this strategy, if successful, is that the Act would continue to
be the law, but without the funding necessary for the Executive Branch to
implement and enforce it. Republicans have, in the past, criticized the President for
selective enforcement of laws such as immigration.404 This strategy would, in
essence, make Republicans responsible for a similar selective enforcement should
the President become unable to implement and enforce due to funding.
Furthermore, because the Act’s key provisions, such as the Individual Mandate and
the Employer Mandate, would still be good law, some companies and individuals

398. See Christopher Brauchli, Perry and the Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2013, 3:50
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-brauchli/perry-and-the-poor_b_3398827.html
(describing how a Texas U.S. Representative and ten others from the Texas Congressional
delegation urged the Texas Governor Perry to expand Medicaid); see also Bonnie Kavoussi, Texas
Medicaid Expansion Supporters Demand Gov. Rick Perry Reverse His Position, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 5, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/05/texas-medicaidexpansion_n_2810892.html (reporting that more than 1,000 supporters of Medicaid planned to
march on the Texas state capital to protest against Governor Perry’s decision to forego Medicaid
expansion).
399. See Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion, supra note 116 (noting that Texas
Governor Rick Perry and the Republican majority in the Texas state Legislature have
“unanimously rejected the Medicaid expansion”).
400. See Perr, supra note 388.
401. See Sahil Kapur, House Has Now Voted 46 Times To Repeal Or Dismantle Obamacare,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Oct. 1, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/househas-now-voted-46-times-to-repeal-or-dismantle-obamacare (noting that the House Republicans
have voted forty-six times to “repeal, defund or dismantle” Obamacare).
402. See Neera Tanden, If at First You Don’t Succeed, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/house-republicans-obamacare-repeal-votes102911_full.html?print#.UvuotEJdXnQ (outlining the House’s attempts to fight the Act, and
describing how in August of 2013, the House changed its tactics from voting to repeal the Act to
trying to prevent funding for Act).
403. See id.
404. See Andrew Stiles, Why Republicans Don’t Trust Obama on Immigration Reform, NAT’L
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might continue to try to comply, whereas others may not. What are employers and
states to do in such a circumstance? Contrary to conventional wisdom, with the
passage of time more questions, not fewer, arise regarding the Act.405 The Supreme
Court decision answered some questions and raised others. While it may be
undebatable that Americans want and need more affordable and better quality
health care, it is certainly debatable whether or how the goals and objectives of the
Act can still be met in its current state.

405. See Bruce F. Howell, One More Time with Feeling: PPACA Cases Post 2012, 9 ABA
HEALTH ESOURCE (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_
health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_1308_howell.html (discussing the various
Constitutional challenges pending against the ACA after the Supreme Court’s ruling).

